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INTRODUCTION

There is no federal physician-patientprivilege.2 This is the mantra that has
continually been recited by federal courts for nearly thirty years. 3 However,
recent developments in science, technology, medicine, and notions of
informational privacy have given Congress and the federal courts just cause to
reevaluate the validity of the continued absence of a federal physician-patient
privilege. What lies at the heart of the debate is the conflict between technology
and privacy. This is not a new conflict.- Justice Louis D. Brandeis, in an oftenquoted dissent in Olmstead v. United States,4 noted that "[c]lauses guaranteeing
to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a...
capacity of adaptation to a changing world."'5 Failure to adapt to a changing
world may result in "[r]ights declared in words... [being] lost in reality."'6 The
time has come to respond to a changing world and recognize a physician-patient
privilege in federal court. Without such a privilege, an individual's personal,
private, and potentially damaging health information could be disclosed to the
public in court proceedings, 7 and subsequently republished many times over, via
print and electronic media including the Internet.

2. The physician-patient privilege allows a patient to prevent his or her physician from revealing
in court, as a witness, confidential information communicated to the physician during the course of
professional treatment. 2 ScoTr N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, §7.01
at 7 (2d ed. McGraw-Hill 1995). The right to assert the privilege generally belongs solely to the
patient who may waive it even when the physician would rather not testify to matters revealed during
the course of treatment. Id. at 8.
3. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (noting that "physician-patient privilege is
unknown to the common law"); Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that federal common law does not recognize physician-patient privilege); Gilbreath v.
Guadalupe Hosp. Found., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that physician-patient privilege
does not exist under federal law).
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Id. at 472.
6. Id.at 473 (quoting Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349,373 (1910)).
7. Specifically, absent a federal physician-patient privilege, physicians can' be compelled by a
federal court to give testimony, based on' information they obtained thi'ough confidential
communications with their patients - information that might be beneficial in court proceedings, but
could be damaging to their patients. STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 7.
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The virtues of physician-patient confidentiality can be traced as far back as
the fourth century through the Hippocratic Oath. 8 The need for a physicianpatient evidentiary privilege has been gaining strength for decades. The
overwhelming majority of states now recognize a physician-patient privilege. 9 A
public policy that favors confidentiality and protects the privacy of patient health
information has emerged in recent years. In 1977, the United States Supreme
Court observed that the Constitution protects individuals' rights to "avoid
disclosure of personal matters" relating to medical information. 10 More recently,
some federal courts have recognized an individual's right to confidentiality of
medical records and medical communications, 11 noting that "few subject areas
[are] more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of
one's health" 12 and that medical information is "precisely13 the sort [of
information] intended to be protected by penumbras of privacy."
Most significant, however, is that Congress, through a broad mandate to the
Department of Health and Human Services, has provided unprecedented
protection to medical privacy in the form of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 14 We contend that HIPAA is one
major source for the foundation of a physician-patient privilege. This privilege
will supply a missing link in the chain of necessary medical privacy protections.
Accordingly, federal courts should now rethink their outdated view rejecting this
privilege' 5 and move to embrace the emerging physician-patient privilege in

8. Attributed to Hippocrates, celebrated physician, circa 400 B.C. The original version of the
oath states in part: "[w]hat I may see or hear in the course of the treatment of even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to
myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about." The Hippocratic Oath: Classical Version,
NOVA ONLINE, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath-classical.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2004). A modem version of the Hippocratic Oath, written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, is taken by many
medical students upon graduation. This modern oath states in part: "I will respect the privacy of my
patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that the world may know." The HippocraticOath:
Modem Version, NOVA ONLINE, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbhInova/doctors/oath-modern.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004).
9. See infra note 439 and accompanying text (listing states that have adopted physician-patient
privilege).
10. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
11. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that "[the constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters clearly encompasses medical information and its confidentiality"); Doe v. Southeastern Penn.
Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that medical records are protected under a
right to privacy); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F;3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in medical records); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a substantial privacy interest in confidential medical
information).
12. Norman-Bloodsaw,135 F.3d at 1269.
13. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1138 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
450 (1972)).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
15. See Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "federal courts do
not recognize a federal physician-patient privilege").
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federal courts.
Evidentiary privileges are exceptions to the duty'of every person to present
'16
evidence, i.e., "give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice.
Privileges promote confidential communications within certain types of special
17
relationships - relationships that are deemed important and socially beneficial.
Privileges also promote an individual's sense of privacy. "Recognition of
evidentiary privileges for certain fundamental relationships promotes personal
autonomy in the sense of decisional privacy.., this facet of autonomy is an
ultimate value."' 18 Even though privileges serve a valuable function, because
they can prevent useful and relevant evidence from being presented in court,
they are narrowly construed and new privileges are rarely recognized.
Currently, the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") do not explicitly
recognize a physician-patient privilege. 19 However, in 1996, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Jaffee v. Redmond,20 used the standard expressed in Rule
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 2' ("FRE 501") to recognize a federal
psychotherapist-patientprivilege. 22 The analysis used in the Jaffee decision will
serve as a model for our contention that a federal physician-patient privilege
should be recognized now.
Since the Jaffee decision, there has been revolutionary change in science,
technology, and government policy. Medical science and technology have
enabled us to expose an ever-expanding wealth of information about an
individual from a wide variety of medical information. 23 There exist evermore
incentives for myriad parties to seek out and exploit information learned in
confidence by physicians, often to the detriment of the patient. 24 Insurers,
employers, creditors, and the business community have discovered that medical
information is a very marketable commodity. 25 At the same time, there has been
an exponential increase in the electronic storage and transfer of medical

16. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
17. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE,
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 13 (2002) (citing GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

AUTONOMY (1988)).
18. Id.
19. Evidence law was originally based in common law. Today, however, it is largely codified in
statutes and rules of court. In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence was adopted by Congress to
"govern proceedings in the courts of the United States." FED. R. EVID. 101.
20. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
21. This rule states that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EViD. 501.
22. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
23. See infra note 335 and accompanying text (discussing how improperly redacted medical
records can yield a wide range of sensitive data).
24. See infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text (describing strong financial incentives for third
parties to pursue and utilize personal health information).
25. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (noting that commercial markets exist for
exchange of authorized and unauthorized medical information).
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information due to evolution of computer technology. 26 Information technology
has made vast and irrevocable 'dissemination of this information simple and
pervasive.2 7 The combination of these factors has created an environment where
physicians' disclosures of their patients' confidences can increasingly result in
devastating and unexpected effects upon the patient and upon society in
general. 28 This rapid and worrisome evolution gives ample justification to the
federal courts to follow the mandate of FRE 501 to "continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges" 29 in response to changed societal
conditions.
These technological advances have already spurred a legislative
reassessment of what government must do to protect the privacy of individuals'
information in the face of new threats. Congress's response to these concerns was
HIPAA. 30 Congress essentially sought to reconcile two competing objectives
through HIPAA: to facilitate the increased use of technology to promote health
care efficiency and to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
medical information challenged by such technological advances. 31 Congress
instructed the United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to promulgate uniform standards to facilitate the exchange of health
information between healthcare providers and "with respect to privacy of certain
health information." 32 HHS's original Privacy Rule, promulgated in 2000,
33
marked an unprecedented policy of federal protection of medical information.
HIPAA was established, in part, to provide "a set of basic national privacy
standards.. .that provide all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace
of mind that is essential to their full participation in'their care. ' 34 Most
importantly, however, the HIPAA Privacy Rule recognized that it was only
26. See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text (noting that electronic storage of medical
information permits health care providers to collect larger amounts of patient data).
27. See infra Part I.B.2 (examining how development of computer technology and Internet has
increased risk that privacy invasions can lead to disclosure of medical information to vast numbers of
people).
28. Unauthorized disclosure of an individual's medical information can result in injury to that
individual's reputation, embarrassment, loss of employment, loss of financial opportunities, including
loans, harassment, and even violence. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY ch. 5
(1999) (discussing systemic violations of the privacy of medical records).
29. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980).
30. 110 Stat. 1936. The primary purpose of HIPAA was the portability of health insurance. See
id. (stating that purpose of HIPAA was to amend Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage for groups and individuals). The privacy
concerns were really an afterthought. See also S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346,348-49 (4th
Cir. 2003) (noting that the goal of HIPAA was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
exchanging information within the health care system).
31. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Part II, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,469 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164) [hereinafter Standards for Privacy

II].
32. HIPAA § 264.
33. See Standards for Privacy 11,65 Fed. Reg. at 82,464 (proclaiming that the federal rules did not
protect the privacy of patient health care information until 2000).
34. Id. at 82,464.
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creating a "framework of protection" that could later be strengthened by
additional necessary state and federal action in the health privacy area to fulfill
35
HIPAA's broad guarantee of medical privacy.
The necessity of strengthening this framework has come sooner than
expected. The Privacy Rule's unprecedented protection of medical privacy was
dealt a serious blow on August 14, 2002 when HHS released final modifications
to the Privacy Rule. 36 The protections that Congress intended and that
HIPAA's original Privacy Rule afforded have been weakened significantly under
the Bush Administration. 37
Consequently, what currently exists is an
unparalleled Congressional intent to protect medical privacy that was defeated
38
by the execution of new privacy rules that fail to adequately further this intent.
The federal judiciary has not yet fully responded to this paradox created by
HIPAA and the final modifications to the Privacy Rule. However, a few federal
courts have begun to jealously guard the privacy of medical information from
disclosure in court in response to HIPAA's mandate and underlying privacy
policies through a new evidentiary privilege.
On February 5, 2004, in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,39 Chief

Judge Charles Kocoras of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois quashed a government subpoena of physicians' abortion
records that were redacted of most patient identifying information. 40 Citing
'41
HIPAA's recognition of "the importance of the privacy of medical records,
Judge Kocoras noted that, under Jaffee and FRE 501, reason and experience
compelled the recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege in the context
42
of abortion information.
On March 26, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, on an expedited appeal, in an opinion authored by Judge Richard
Posner, affirmed Judge Kocoras's decision. However, the court summarily and
inexplicably rejected Kocoras's finding of a new federal physician-patient
privilege, noting that "[i]t is not for us -especially in so summary a proceeding as
this litigation.., to create one, whether all at once or by a process of slow but
43
inevitable additions to the sole category recognized by Jaffee."
The need to recognize a new physician-patient privilege must remain a
priority for federal courts. The increasing attention that Congress has been
giving to medical privacy issues over the past decade will likely bring this issue to
35. See id. (noting that HIPAA "creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened by
both the federal government and by states as health information systems continue to evolve").
36. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Part V, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164) [hereinafter Standards for Privacy V].
37. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing 2002 modifications to HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
38. Id.
39. No. 04-C-55, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2004).
40. Id. at *20.
41. Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (W.D. Va. 2001)).
42. Id. at *18-20.
43. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the Supreme Court sometime in the not too distant future. Both Congress and
many state legislatures have recognized that an individual's right to prevent,
disclosure of his or her personal medical information is in imminent danger of
total. and irrevocable abrogation." The overwhelming majority of states now
recognize a physician-patient privilege. The federal courts have so far not
followed suit. In the wake of the Bush Administration's modifications to the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 there is urgency for a federal physician-patient privilege
to ensure that medical information is sufficiently protected in the context of
federal litigation.
This article will examine two alternate foundations for a new federal
physician-patient privilege that relies upon HIPAA as a prominent factor in
each. In Part I, we will discuss HIPAA's effect on medical privacy. Part II will
examine HIPAA's implicit recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege as
an act of Congress. Part III will set forth a foundation for a federal physicianpatient privilege using the model that the Supreme Court established in Jaffee v.
Redmond.
In this article, we call on federal courts to apply the directive of FRE 501
and recognize a federal physician-patient privilege to govern judicial
proceedings, including those arising under federal question jurisdiction of the
federal, courts. The ultimate nature of the proposed privilege is beyond the
scope of this paper. In time, courts will fashion the contours of this privilege.
Nonetheless, we must caution that in the development of this privilege, courts
must be careful to maintain the confidentiality of medical information and to
limit exceptions to confidentiality to rare instances when societal demands for
disclosure of this information substantially outweigh the interests of privacy.
Even then, exceptions should be made only in those instances where the
proponent of the evidence can demonstrate that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs the danger of harm and embarrassment to the
reputation of the patient, the holder of the privilege.
I. PROTECTING MEDICAL PRIVACY THROUGH HIPAA

AND THE PHYSICIAN-

PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Medical records are beacons into our past. They reveal secrets about
families. They strip us naked, as if we had been prepped for surgery.
They remind us about things we would rather forget - and things that
we don't want others ever to discover.
46
Medical records are also windows to our future...
The Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

44. See infra Parts I, III.B.5 (discussing the protection of medical privacy through HIPAA and
the consensus of state legislatures of physician-patient privilege).
45. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing 2002 modifications to HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
46. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

125 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000).
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("HIPAA"), was initially designed to improve the portability and continuity of
health insurance allowing workers and their families to remain covered when
they change or lose their jobs. 47 Recognizing the increasing importance of
protecting the privacy of health information in response to rapid evolution of
science and technology, Congress included a directive to protect patient health
information by establishing transaction standards for the exchange of health
information. In addition, security standards and privacy standards were
established for the collection, use, and disclosure of individually identifiable
48
health information.
The mandate to provide privacy protections for health information is
contained within the administrative simplification sections of HIPAA. 49 This
mandate directed the United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to recommend to Congress "standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information" 50 that addressed three broad areas
of concern: (1) what are the rights of an individual who is a subject of
individually identifiable health information; 51 (2) what procedures should be
established for the exercise of such rights;52 and (3) what uses and disclosures of
such information should be authorized or required. 53 HHS responded to this
mandate by setting privacy standards for a variety of disclosures including those
standards that are directly on point with the authors' contentions in this article:
' 54
standards for "[d]isclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings.
HIPAA further directed HHS to promulgate final regulations concerning
such standards if Congress failed to enact comprehensive health information
privacy legislation before August 1999. 55 Congress did not meet its self-imposed
deadline. 56 Consequently, pursuant to the statutory mandate, HHS drafted
proposed regulations in November 1999. 57 HHS published the regulations in

47. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
"[T]o improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term
care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other
purposes."

Id.
48. 1d § 264(c)(1).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 264(a).
51. Id. § 264(b).
52. HIPAA § 264(b).

53. Id.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2002).

55. HIPAA § 264(c)(1).
56. See S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that several
medical privacy bills were introduced after HHS had submitted detailed recommendations in
September 1997, but that Congress did not pass any more legislation).
57. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Part IV, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164) [hereinafter Standards for Privacy
IV].
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final form on December 28, 2000.58 These Privacy Rule standards significantly
restricted the ability of covered entities, 59 including health care providers, to
6
divulge patient medical records. 0
As HHS was given a very broad mandate by Congress to recommend and
ultimately promulgate the Privacy Rule, HHS's commentary on the regulations
61
supplies the primary source for "legislative" intent behind the Privacy Rule.
The intent was clear-HHS unambiguously articulated the importance of health
information privacy and the immediate need for a national health privacy
62
framework.
HHS commented on the inherent conflict between technology and privacy,
in particular, the connection between the increasing use of interconnected
electronic information systems in the health care context and the loss of health
information privacy. 63 In doing so, HHS emphasized the fact that advances in
technologies used to collect and disseminate patient health information have
"reduced or eliminated many of the financial and logistical obstacles that
previously served to protect the confidentiality of health information and the
privacy interests of individuals." 64 Simply, the pervasiveness of and access to
medical information in electronic form creates the likelihood that such
information will be wrongfully disclosed or used in a manner that may harm the
patient. 65 Technological advancements in information systems "may provide a
reason for institutionalizing privacy protections in situations where the risk of
66
harm did not previously justify writing such protections into law."
An examination of HHS's commentary on the original Privacy Rule
exposes the breadth and the strength of HIPAA's intended protection of
58. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28. 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 &
164). The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; Final Rule, produced
under the auspices of then HHS secretary, Donna Shalala, included a detailed background discussion
section, a section-by-section description of the final rules and a section-by-section discussion of the
comments received by HHS. Id.
59. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002). The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines a covered entity as "(1) A
health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter." Id.
60. See United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (W.D. Va. 2001) (concluding that
Congress has restricted ability of most health care providers to divulge patient medical records).
61. The authors use the preamble to the 2000 Privacy Rule (available at Standards for Privacy II,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462) extensively in this section. HHS provided extensive information related to the
state of the art of technology and governmental intent that necessitated formation of the Privacy Rule
in the preamble to the 2000 Privacy Rule. There was no comparable exposition of intent following the
2002 modifications (available at Standards for Privacy V, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182). As such, the preamble
to the 2000 Privacy Rule remains the clearest statement of intent behind promulgation of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule References to any modified sections will rely on the 2002 version. As the rationale for
HIPAA's privacy protections closely mirrors the rationale for the federal physician-patient privilege,
HHS's research in this area is readily applicable in the-present case.
62. Standards for Privacy 11,65 Fed. Reg. at 82,462.
63. Id. at 82,463.
64. Id. at 82,465.
65. Id. at 82,465-66.

66. Id.
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physician-patient communications. HHS explained that patients' ability to trust
that personal and often-sensitive communications with their physicians will be67
protected and kept confidential is "vital" to furthering HIPAA's intent.
Moreover, HHS noted that state privacy laws fail to adequately protect the
68
privacy of the patient's health information. The intent of the Privacy Rule was
to establish "a set of basic national privacy standards ...that provide all
Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind that is essential to
their full participation in their care." 69 HHS recognized that the Privacy Rule's
"framework of protection" would allow both state and federal governments to
further strengthen privacy protections as technologies, specifically health
information systems, advance. 70 Thus, HIPAA was enacted with a broad and
evolutionary mandate to provide strong federal protection of medical privacy.
However, with the change in administrations, so came a change in policy. In
February 2001, newly appointed HHS Secretary, Tommy Thompson, re-opened
the Privacy Rule for public comment. 71 HHS modified the Privacy Rule in 2002
in response to comments to the original Privacy Rule of 2000.7273 On August 14,
2002, HHS released the final modifications to the Privacy Rule.
74
Although much of the original Privacy Rule was retained, the final
75
modifications contained several important changes. Most significantly, the
67. Standards for Privacy 11,65 Fed. Reg. at 82,463.
68. Id. at 82,463-64.
69. Id. at 82,464.
70. Id.
71. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Part IV, 66 Fed.
Reg. 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164) (deferring implementation of 2000
version of statute due to procedural mistakes relating to notice and comment).
72. Standards for Privacy V, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 &
164).
73. See id. (modifying Privacy Rule in accordance with stated policy goals of maintaining strong
privacy protection for health information and avoiding unintended administrative problems created by
original incarnation of rule).
74. See Citizens For Health v. Thompson, No. 03-2267, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5745, at *20 (E.D.
Pa., Apr. 2, 2004) (noting that with few exceptions the 2002 Privacy Rule was consistent with the
protections of the 2000 Privacy Rule).
75. Admittedly, on their face, the modifications decreased the amount of privacy granted to
protected health information because they allowed for greater dissemination of personal and private
health information with a lower level of consent. See generally HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, INST.
FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIV., SUMMARY OF HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE, at 18 (2002), available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-docRegSummnary2002.pdf (noting
that covered entities may choose, but are not retuired, to elicit consent from patients to disclose
health-related information and that statute neither defines consent nor provides required means for
obtaining it) (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). These changes violated the strong privacy protection
authorized under the statute. See also Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg, at 82,462 (explaining
importance of health information privacy). A full discussion of the effect of the modifications is
beyond the scope of this article. However, this decreased level of protection does not contradict our
contention that HIPAA, even under the modified rules, supports a federal physician-patient privilege
for the reasons set forth in this article. In fact, this decreased level of protection, which is contrary to
the policies and Congressional intent underlying the statute, is further indication that a federal
physician-patient privilege is needed now more than ever.
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modifications remove the regulations' former requirement of mandatory consent
for uses and disclosures of protected health information for treatment, payment,
or health care operations. 76 The 2002 Privacy Rule modifications also erode
some of the patient's original protections under the 2000 Privacy Rule through
liberalization of nonconsensual disclosure of health information for "marketing"
77
of health services or products.
Thus, while purporting to reflect "a continuing commitment ... to strong
privacy protections for medical records, '' 78 the modifications undermined some
of the privacy protections of the original 2000 Privacy Rule and arguably fail to
achieve HIPAA's intended level of privacy protection for individually
identifiable health information.
A.

How Does HIPAA ProtectMedical Privacy?
1.

HIPAA Protects a Broad Scope of Information

In passing HIPAA, Congress recognized that medical treatment requires
the exchange of personal, sensitive information between an individual and a
physician. 79 The Privacy Rule recognized that the patient's ability to trust that
sensitive medical information will be kept private and confidential by the
physician is "vital" to the physician-patient relationship. 80
HIPAA explicitly mandated that every "covered entity"81 must "maintain
reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to
ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information. "' 82 The Privacy Rule

76. See HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 75, at 15, 17-18 (noting that 2002 incarnation
of Privacy Rule does not require consent for health-related communications).
77. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (defining marketing as making a communication about a
product or service that encourages purchase, or disclosure of health information by a covered entity to
another entity, but excluding a communication related to patient's treatment or health plan); id. §
164.508(a)(3) (2002) (excluding face-to-face communications, complimentary gifts, or direct or indirect
remuneration of a covered entity from a third party from definition of marketing). See also HEALTH
& PRIVACY PROJECT,supra note 75, at 20-21 (summarizing the marketing provision in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule). The 2002 Privacy Rule purports to require a patient's consent for disclosure of
"protected health information" for use for "marketing" purposes. Id. at 15. Unlike the original
Privacy Rule, however, the 2002 Privacy Rule expressly excludes any communications in any way
related to health from the definition of "marketing." Id. at 20. This would permit disclosure (without
the patient's consent or any way to "opt-out") of protected health information for such purposes as
communications from pharmacies paid for by drug companies recommending that an individual switch
to the drug company's product. See id. at 21 (giving examples of ways marketers can bypass provisions
of Privacy Rule). The basic effect of this modification is to retain the requirement of a patient's
consent only for communications that are not health. related. Id. at 20-21. Anything else would be
permitted without the patient's consent. See id. at 21 (noting that many common marketing practices
are still permitted without patient's consent).
78. Standards for Privacy V, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,183.
79. Standards for Privacy It, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,463.
80. See id. (noting importance of developing trusting relationship between doctor and patient).
81. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002) (defining "covered entity").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2)(A) (2000).
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defines a covered entity as "a health plan, health care clearinghouse, or a health
care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form" in
83
connection with a transaction covered by the Rule. The resultant Privacy Rule
85
84
covers "protected health information" ("PHI"), defined as health information 87
86
entity.
that is individually identifiable and created or received by a covered
This encompasses any information that "relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health
care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
"any health
health care to an individual. '88 This definition essentially covers
89
doctor."
her
or
his
to
divulge
would
patient
a
that
information
The scope of information available to a physician is extremely broad and
includes personal information about the patient, such as birth date, address,
education, income, employer, financial and billing information, subjective
information about a patient's mental state, employer held health information
about the individual patient and his or her family and, of course, medical
records. 90 Medical records can include diagnosis or treatment for sensitive
medical conditions such as sexually transmitted diseases, contraception,
abortion, substance abuse problems, mental illness, and medications that a
patient may reasonably consider personal and private and wish to guard from

83. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. The Privacy Rule defines protected health information as "individually
identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i)
Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic medium; or (iii) Transmitted or
maintained in any other form or medium." Id. § 160.103.
85. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. The Privacy Rule defines health information as:
"any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or
received by a health care provider, health plan,. public health authority, employer, life
insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past,
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
health care to an individual."
Id. See also HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 75, at 5 (discussing definitions provided in
Privacy Rule).
86. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. The Privacy Rule defines individually identifiable health information
(IIHI) as:
"information that is a subset of health information, including demographic information
collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an -individual; the provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual."

Id. See also HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 75, at 5 (discussing definitions provided in
Privacy Rule).
87. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining covered entity).
88. Id.
89. HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 75, at 5.
90. See id. (defining individually identifiable health information).
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public disclosure. 91
There was initially some ambiguity as to whether HIPAA applied beyond
electronic transmission of health informatioh by covered entities. 92 However,
the Fourth Circuit, in South CarolinaMedical Ass'n v. Thompson, 93 recently held
that in enacting HIPAA, Congress had "expressly defined 'health information'
to include any information, 'whether oral or recordedin any form or medium."' 94
Thus, HIPAA also covers non-electronic forms of health information as well as
the non-electronic transmission of PHI. 95 The Fourth Circuit explained that
"regulating non-electronic as well as electronic forms of health information
effectuates HIPAA's intent to promote the efficient and effective portability of
health information and the protection of confidentiality.,, 96 The court explained
that if this were otherwise, there would be "perverse incentives" for health care
providers to avoid computerization of medical records. 97 This would "utterly
frustrate the purposes of HIPAA. ''98 Consequently, both paper and electronic
records and electronic and non-electronic transmissions of PHI are covered by
HIPAA. 99
The allusions to "Administrative Simplification"100 and "Standards for
Information Transactions" contained in the text of HIPAA, therefore, should
not obscure the fact that HIPAA's scope encompasses virtually any health
information that is exchanged with one's physician. 10 1
2.

HIPAA Creates a Two-Tiered System of Privacy Protection

Through the Privacy Rule, HIPAA creates an absolute floor of
confidentiality for medical information. 1° 2 Moreover, the bulk of the Privacy
Rule addresses permissive uses and disclosures 10 3 and only requires a covered
entity to disclose PHI under two very narrow circumstances: when the patient
requests access to his or her own information and when compelled by HHS for

91. LISA M. BOYLE & DAVID M. MACK, HIPAA: A GuIDE TO HEALTH CARE PRIVACY AND-

SECURITY LAW 1:2 (2d supp. 2004).
92. See, e.g., S.C. Med. Ass'n, 327 F.3d at 353 (rejecting novel argument that HIPAA applied
exclusively to electronic transmissions of protected health information).
93. 327 F.3d 346.

94. Id. at 353 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-4).
95. Id.

96. Id. at 354.
97. Id.
98. S.C. Med. Ass'n, 327 F.3d at 354
99. Id.
100. Standards for Privacy V, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2. HIPAA covers all health information exchanged with a physician
provided that the physician fits the definition of "covered entity." See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining
covered entity).
102. See also HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 75, at 5 (noting that information must be
(1) health information, (2) individually identifiable, and (3) created or received by a covered entity,
and that exceptions apply).
103. Id. at 12-16 (discussing generally applicable permissive uses and disclosures).
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compliance and enforcement purposes. 1°4 Thus, Congress essentially deferred to
the ethical obligations of the covered health care entities "to use their own best
judgment in deciding when they will permit the use and disclosure of protected
health information."' 10 5 Physicians, in particular, have a general, ethical
obligation to keep the medical information of their patients confidential unless
required by law to do otherwise.10 6 Thus, Congress has given its full mandate to
physicians to fulfill their ethical obligations of confidentiality, except where other
laws may require disclosure. This means that a "covered entity" may choose not
to disclose information, even if HIPAA would technically allow such disclosures.
While the Privacy Rule thus establishes an absolute floor for protection of
confidential health information, HIPAA implicitly defers to the covered entities'
ethical obligations with respect to any specific disclosure, thus providing an
additional layer of privacy protection.
The practical effect of this dual protection of confidentiality is that patients
are assured that their medical information will be generally protected from
disclosure and that their medical information will further be protected by the
ethical constraints of the medical profession. This is an important element to
address with respect to HIPAA because the medical profession's ethical
obligations generally require confidentiality unless the patient consents to
disclosure or the physician is required to disclose the information by
requirements of the law. 1°7 In effect, HIPAA has given physicians the support of
federal law to maintain confidentiality of their patients' medical information.
B.

Why a FederalPhysician-PatientPrivilege is Needed Now

Absent a federal physician-patient privilege, physicians may be compelled
by a federal court to give testimony and thereby disclose protected health
information obtained through confidential communications with their patientsrelevant information that might be beneficial to a party in court proceedings, but
could be damaging to their patients' privacy and reputation. Admissibility of
such evidence, absent a privilege, may ultimately defeat the very privacy
protections Congress intended HIPAA to protect.
HIPAA demonstrates congressional awareness and recognition that
medical privacy is an important right. The amount and severity of potential
violations of that right are increasing over time as technology advances. HIPAA
only goes so far in providing national standards for health information privacy.
A federally recognized physician-patient privilege would promote the policies
underlying HIPPA in two ways. First, the privilege would protect the patient's
interest in shielding the privacy of his or her medical information. Second, the
privilege would enhance and preserve the physician-patient relationship-a
104. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)-(b).
105. HEALTH & PRIVACY PROJECr, supra note 75, at 13.

106. See infra notes 503-12 and accompanying text (discussing physician's ethical rules requiring
confidentiality).
107. See infra Part III.B.9 (discussing the medical profession's recognition of the necessity of a
physician-patient privilege).
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relationship that society values as important and beneficial to the public as well
as the individual patient.1 08 Neither-of these rationales was sufficient to justify
recognition of the physician-patient privilege at common law. 10 9 In a less
litigious society of years past, patients may have been less likely to withhold
information from their physicians "for fear of later courtroom exposure, both
because the possibility of litigation is less likely to be uppermost in a patient's
mind and because withholding information could jeopardize treatment."110 As
we will show infra, these reasons are simply not applicable in today's medical
environment.
Privileges are not etched in stone. The decision in Jaffee v. Redmond11
illustrates the need for new privileges to be recognized as the common law
adapts to varying conditions such as the evolving landscape of medical privacy.
1. Physicians Know More About Their Patients Than Ever Before
Patients now live in a world where their physicians can know so much more
about them than ever before. One particularly important example is the wealth
of new information that is made available through genetic testing. Perhaps the
most significant scientific development in recent times was the decoding of the
human genome by the Human Genome Project. 112 As a result, the number of
genetic tests for various diseases and conditions has expanded from a handful ten
years ago to hundreds today. 1 3 These tests now range from relatively rare
genetic disorders to common forms of certain breast and colon cancers." 14
Genetic information can also be used to predict an individual's propensity for
future illnesses and behaviors. 15 Thus, concerns about unauthorized disclosure
and misuse of genetic information are clearly understandable:
Genetic information, which is a subset of medical information, is
particularly sensitive because it reveals unique and immutable
attributes. Those attributes are not just personal, but shared by family
108. See 2 SCOTT N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §7.01 at 8 (2d ed.
McGraw-Hill 1995) (noting physician-patient privilege promotes protection of the patient's interest in
privacy).
109. See BARUCH A. BRODY ET AL., MEDICAL ETHICS: ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY
THE CODES OPINIONS AND STATEMENTS 200-02 (2001) (noting that physician-patient privilege
developed statutorily in contrast to attorney-client privilege which developed out of the common law).
110. STONE & TAYLOR, supranote 108, at 9.

111. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
112. See generally NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ALL ABOUT THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (claiming that human genome project gave researchers the ability to
understand genetic blueprint for human beings), at http://www.genome.gov/10001772 (last updated
Aug. 2004).
1... . .
113. See COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: CRG POSITION

PAPER (JAN. 2001), at http://www.gene-watch.org/educational/genetic discrimination.pdf (noting that
genetic tests are becoming increasingly utilized for routine medical diagnosis).
114. See id. (stating that in addition to diagnosing genetic disorders, genetic tests can screen for
predispositions to other diseases).
115. See id (explaining that discrimination could result from an individual being labeled on basis
of expected future conduct resulting from a determined genetic predisposition).
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members as well. This information has the potential to give us, and
others, a frightening, or reassuring, glimpse into the future." 6
While the Human Genome Project brought hopes of prolonging lives by
detecting and preventing diseases at an early stage, it also brought fears that an
individual's genetic information could be disseminated to and manipulated by
myriad parties to the detriment of the patient. "The repercussions of genetic
information falling into the wrong hands can be far ranging and include the loss
of insurance or employment, having a mortgage called in or denied, or having
genetic information used in child custody disputes or personal injury lawsuits." '17
Also, due in part to the movement toward electronic storage of medical
information, a greater amount and variety of information is being recorded by
health care providers. 118 Physicians traditionally retained minimal written
records about their patients. 119 Computerization of medical information has
encouraged health care providers to increase the scope of the information that is
collected from patients.1 20
Medical records now include demographic
information, financial information, personal, social, and lifestyle information,
such as sexual orientation and addictions, as well as medical information, such as
2
diagnoses, treatments, and family medical histories.' '
2. Advances in Information Technology Pose New Potential Threats To
Patient Privacy
Advances in information technology have posed a number of challenges to
the privacy of health information. First, the increase of centralized databases of
health information about patients' risks exposes far more information about the
patient in the event of a breach than was previously available. The continuing
development of computer technology, and the Internet has vastly increased the
risk that invasions of privacy can lead to disclosure of medical information to
vast numbers of people. 22 As far back as Whalen v. Roe 23 in 1977, the Supreme
Court recognized "the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks."'1 24 Whalen, while

116. Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 285, 285
(2002).
117. Joanne L. Hustead et al., GENETICS AND PRIVACY: A PATCHWORK OF PROTECTIONS, CAL.
HEALTHCARE FOUND., at 11 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/
GeneticsAndPrivacy.pdf.

118. See AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITs OF PRIVACY 142 (1999) (noting that HMO-run managed
care programs and health industry are increasingly compiling extensive information regarding patients'
histories and treatments to determine necessity and propriety of providing requested health care).
119. Id. See also BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:5 (noting historically physicians knew their
patients' histories and had no need for extensive written records).
120. Id. at 1:10-11.
121. BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:10-11.
122. See Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,465-66, (explaining how advances in

computer technology eliminated safeguards that protected confidentiality of health information).
123. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
124. Id. at 605.
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prescient, could never have foreseen the extent to which computerized storage of
information would threaten privacy.
Only a few generations ago, physicians kept few medical records on their
patients at all, as there was a more personalized relationship between physician
and patient.125 Even in the recent past, the bulk of patients' health information
was regularly stored on paper in actual health care facilities. 126 Clearly, this
system of scattered paper records was vastly more inefficient than the
computerized systems that are widely employed today. 127 However, the
inefficient paper storage methods of medical information provided a certain
degree of protection against widespread dissemination. Physical limitations to
disclosure of paper records provided both actual and perceived protections of
confidentiality.1 28 "Paper records are physical. Paper records can only exist in
one place at one time. And while paper records can be faxed all over town, a
12 9
person must be physically holding the records in order to do so."
The health care industry has increasingly moved to storing patients' medical
information electronically. In 1996, the year in which Jaffe was decided, the
health care industry spent an estimated ten to fifteen billion dollars on
information technology. 130 In particular, there is an increasing reliance on health
131
database organizations ("HDOs"), such as the Medical Information Bureau.
Essentially, these organizations store comprehensive health data on all
individuals in a certain population in a centralized database. 32 HDOs acquire
both individually identifiable and non-identifiable data from individual health
records kept by physicians and hospitals, information from secondary sources
such as insurance companies, government programs, public health surveillance
and tracking systems, health services research, government, academics, and
133
private surveys, and many other sources and numerous other data sources.
While electronic storage of medical information is not necessarily a new concept,
there is the increasing possibility of a wide use of "patient-based longitudinal
which is essentially "a single record for every person in the
health records,'
125. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 489 (1995)
(discussing changes in physician-patient relationships making electronic medical databases a
necessity).
126. Id. at 457.
127. See id. (noting that paper records are often fragmented, inaccurate, poorly documented,
duplicative, and not available when needed for patient care),
128. BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:5.
129. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
149 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000).
130. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,465 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING
ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION (1997)).
131. See GARFINKEL, supra note 129, at 137 (discussing data keeping function of HDOs such as
MIB).
132. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 463-64 (discussing the development of health databases and
networks).
133. See id. at 464 (explaining how and where HDOs acquire their data).
134. Id. at 458.
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United States, continually expanded from prebirth to death and accessible to a
wide range of individuals and institutions for a variety of purposes. '"135
It is undisputed that central electronic storage of medical information has
many beneficial aspects for both patients and the health care industry, including
facilitating efficient medical services to patients, speeding the processing of
medical claims, and generally improving the quality of care that the patient
receives.13 6 However, electronic storage of medical information also has both
the real and perceived effect of increasing access to private and comprehensive
medical information. While there are safeguards to protect unauthorized
dissemination of private medical information, the fact remains that records that
Were once locked in a file cabinet are now accessible electronically in one
centralized location. Understandably, there exists at least a perception that
dissemination of personal and private medical information may only require "a
push of a button. 1 37 The advent of centralized medical databases has given
patients ample reason to fear that that their health information may be misused.
Second, the increasing popularity of the Internet as a means of
communication poses both direct and indirect challenges to the integrity of
medical information. 138 The direct problem with increasing use of the Internet is
the inherent risk that communication via computer poses to confidentiality:
Hospitals are experimenting with putting patient records on the
Internet not only to improve the quality and efficiency of health care
services (for example, to allow clinical information to be quickly
accessed in an emergency room across town) but also to empower
patients to read their own records and even to challenge the
139
information contained in them.
Privacy concerns abound, however; "once online, health information can be
linked with other, non-health data sets - such as an individual's credit report - to
create encompassing personal dossiers."1'4
Moreover, Internet sites are
vulnerable to intrusions. The end result is that online health information may be

135. Id.
136. See Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,465 (noting advantages and disadvantages of
using computerized databases to store medical information). See also Lawrence 0. Gostin and James
G. Hodge, Jr., PersonalPrivacy and Common Goods: A Frameworkfor Balancing Under the National

Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439 (2002) (discussing "health data privacy
regulations" approved by President Bush on Apr. 12, 2001).
137. See Standards for Privacy 11,65 Fed. Reg. at 82,465 (explaining that easily accessible medical
records eliminate obstacles that protect confidentiality and therefore strengthens argument for
protecting privacy of health information). See also GARFINKEL, supra note 129, at 149 (citing the 1993
Harris-Equifax survey to note that "74% of physicians thought that computerized systems were
'almost certain to weaken' medical confidentiality, compared to 26% who thought that computers
'could be managed to strengthen confidentiality').
138. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 139-82 (discussing how Internet facilitates access
to healthcare records).
139. Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health? An Introduction To The Law,
Ethics, And HIPAA Rule On Medical Privacy, 17 GA. S'. U. L. REV. 481,485 (2000).

140. ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 143.
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more susceptible to unauthorized and damaging disclosures.
The indirect problem that the Internet poses to health information privacy
is that the Internet is a stunningly efficient vehicle for disseminating information
quickly. Thus, the consequences for any particular breach are far more dire than
they have been in the past. Sensitive, private information could easily be
published on the Internet and immediately accessible to anyone with a computer
and Internet connection.
One example of this phenomenon is abortion information. Because of the
passions and controversy associated with this issue, a number of websites
devoted to both sides of this issue have been created. 142 If information about
women who have had an abortion or physicians who have performed them is
posted on the Internet (information that may have been obtained legally through
disclosure in a judicial proceeding or illegally through unauthorized access to a
computer database, for example), these individuals may be subjected to
embarrassment, harassment or even violence by any one who discovers this
information via a simple Internet search. 143 Without a doubt, the Internet has
created a tool for dissemination of information that exponentially magnifies the
damage from any particular disclosure of medical information.
In addition, physicians are also increasingly using e-mail to communicate
with patients. 144 Even though a thorough discussion of the privacy implications
of the use of e-mail in the medical environment is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that there is legitimate and growing concern that
neither physicians nor patients realize the risks of disclosure inherent in this
medium.
3. There is an Increasing Number of Individuals with Access to Patients'
Medical Information
Another troubling consequence of technological evolution is the increasing
number of individuals who can access a patient's medical information. Much of
this increased access is attributable to centralized electronic storage of medical
information. The rapid growth of "integrated health care delivery systems" has

141. Id. at 140-44.
142. See, e.g., Catholic Information Network, Pro-Life Internet Directory, at http://www.cin.org/
life/proldir.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004) (listing 36 pro-life websites). See also Planned Parenthood
v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that anti-abortion
activists' public disclosure of names and addresses of abortion providers was not protected under First
Amendment), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). "
143. See N.W. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
HIPAA did not bar production of medical records for use in suit challenging constitutionality of
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act). Judge Posner seems to have accepted this as a legitimate fear that
women may have from disclosure and dissemination. Posner noted that "hostility to abortion has at
times erupted into violence, including criminal obstruction of entry into abortion clinics, the
firebombing of clinics, and the assassination of physicians who perform abortions." Id. at 929. Thus,
women who have-had abortions may be afraid that "skillful 'Googlers"' may sift through abortion
records contained in a trial record and subject them to "threats, humiliation, and obloquy." Id.
144. Id.
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vastly expanded the number of individuals who have access to an individual's
medical information. 145 Statistics indicate that anywhere from 150 to as many as
400 persons may see at least some portion, of a patient's medical record during
the course of a single hospital stay. 146
While a patient was formerly treated "one-on-one" by his or her physician,
modern medicine increasingly relies upon networks of health care providers to
serve a patient's specific medical needs. 147 The result of these "integrated health
care delivery systems" is a growing number of medical professionals and others
who have access to health information. 148 Further, as many health plan functions
are outsourced, insurance administrators are often not affiliated with the
physician or the health care provider. 149 The end result is that exponentially
more individuals have access to private medical information than in the past, and
the risk of exposure and dissemination of medical information is greatly
magnified.150
While many disclosures of medical information are authorized, some are
not. In spite of the protections provided under HIPAA, unauthorized
"browsing" of electronically stored medical information by employees of health
care providers can occur. 151 Motivations behind this browsing may include
curiosity (e.g., about friends, neighbors, relatives, or celebrities), perversity (e.g.,
sexual interests), anger (e.g., on the part of an employee who is about to be or
152
has recently been dismissed), or a desire for financial or political gain.
4. There are Strong Financial Incentives for Third Parties to Seek Out and
Exploit Personal Medical Information for Pecuniary Gain
Strong incentives exist for myriad parties to seek out and utilize personal
health information. Individually identifiable medical information, like most
personally identifiable information, 153 is a valuable commodity. 154 Thus, a
145. See Standards for Privacy 11, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,465 (stating that greater privacy protection is
needed due to increasing availability of health care records).
146. See id. at 82,466 (citing an American Health Information Management Association report
that "an average of 150 people 'from nursing staff to x-ray technicians, to billing clerks' have access to
a patient's medical records during the course of a typical hospitalization"). See also Sue Blevins,
Medical Privacy Invasion?, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A17 (describing a report by the
Congressional Research Service). See also GARFINKEL, supra note 129, at 131 (noting breaches of
confidentiality that occur during hospital stays, such as when hospital employees are poorly trained or
hold grudges against their employers).
147. See Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,466 (outlining how changes in health care
system have made patient information more accessible).
148. See id. (discussing consequences of maintaining electronic medical records).
149. See id (explaining that patient health records are often not protected because there is a
need to share information between different entities).
150. See generally ETZIONL, supra note 118, at 144-48 (concluding that most privacy violations
occur when employees with authorized access misuse information).
151. Scott. supra note 139, at 488 (explaining that one of the most pervasive abuses of privacy
occurs when health care employees browse a patient's computerized medical records).
152. David L. Coleman, Who's GuardingMedical Privacy?, Bus. & HEALTH, at 29 (March 1999).
153. Personally identifiable information is data that in and of itself reveals a person's identity
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commercial market exists for the authorized and unauthorized exchange of
medical information. 155 Some of the more insidious uses of individually
identifiable medical information include data-mining by information brokers,
advertising firms, or even pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies to create
customer lists for direct marketing campaigns. 156 This type of information has
value to the news media, lawyers, employers, insurance companies, financial
institutions, and many others who can use and abuse it to their advantage, often
157
for commercial gain.
While the threats to privacy that the above incentives pose are all serious,
the example of insurers' and employers' increasing incentives to seek out
patients' genetic information provides a particularly strong illustration of the
increasing threat to medical privacy. Despite the dubious efficacy of genetics as
a predictive tool,158 there remains a realistic fear that genetic information could
be used as the basis for discrimination by employers, insurance companies, and
health care providers. 159 Even before the decoding of the human genome, the
majority of the American public feared that genetic information could be used to
such as a name, social security number, address, telephone number, etc.
154. See generally PAUL H. RUBIN & THOMAS M. LENARD, PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCIAL
USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (2002) (evaluating the commercial market for personal information

and whether it should be subject to regulation).
155. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 487 (noting that this market is motivated by both health care
workers' desire to make money and by the public's desire to acquire such inforamtion, either for
business or gossip).
156. See, e.g., Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 746 N.E. 2d 522, 526 (Ma. 2001) (addressing suit in
which pharmacies and drug companies used pharmacy records for marketing purposes); Anonymous
v. CVS, Corp., 188 Misc. 2d 616 (N.Y. 2001) (discussing lawfulness of selling patient's pharmaceutical
records); Press Release, Eli Lilly Settles Charges Concerning Security Breach, Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 18, 2002) (reporting on settlement agreement resulting from Eli Lilly's failure to
safeguard information pertaining to users of Prozac who subscribed to company's e-mail alert
program), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/elililly.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2004); James
Frederick, Patient Privacy Lawsuit Casts Net Over Drug Makers, DRUG STORE NEWS (Sept. 7, 1998)
(reporting on a class action lawsuit against four major drug manufacturers and CVS for violating
patient privacy rights through direct marketing tactics), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mim3374/is n14_v20/ai_21147325.
157. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 263 (2003)

(noting that creditors may perceive a person with a predisposition to contracting a fatal disorder as not
"worth the risk of lending money to"). See also Marianne Lavelle, Health Plan Debate Turning to
Privacy:Some Callfor Safeguards on Medical Disclosure. Is FederalLaw Necessary?, NAT'L L.J., May
30, 1994, at Al (noting abuses of access to healthcare information and need to legislatively protect
patient privacy). A banker who also sat on a county board gained access to patients' records and
identified several people with cancer and called in their mortgages. Id.
158. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of PersonalHealth Care Information, 76
TEx. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1997) (noting limited ability of genetics to predict a person's future health and
behavior).
159. See EEOC v. Woodbridge, Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing an instance
where an employer used neurometry tests to disqualify job applicants at risk of carpal tunnel
syndrome); EEOC v. Rockwell, 243 F.3d 1012, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing instance when an
employer allegedly discriminated against employees based on genetic testing). See also COUNCIL FOR
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, supra note 113 (describing actual cases of genetic discrimination in the areas
of employment and health insurance).
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their detriment by employers and insurance companies. 160 The fact that the
variety of available genetic tests is increasing makes the stakes even higher.
a.

Employers

Medical information could be used in employment decisions to select
prospective employees who will have greater productivity, less absenteeism, will
be less of a burden on employer-funded health and life insurance, and will give
the employer a greater return on employment training.1 61 Many employers have
ready access to an employee's genetic information. 62 The abuse of medical
information by employers was not unfounded even prior to the decoding of the
human genome. 163 Access to even more information gives an even greater
incentive to employers to discriminate against employees who may have a
genetic predisposition for illnesses that may lower productivity or may be
perceived as high risk to incur substantial medical bills.
The physician's role in the dissemination of potentially sensitive medical
164
information to employers is substantial and, in the past, not uncommon.
Disclosures of job-related injuries,, periodic Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ('"OSHA") mandated examinations of employees, substance
abuse tests, and much more medical information is made available to

160. See Hustead et al., supra note 117, at 11 (citing several recent studies and noting that 63% of
people surveyed would not take genetic tests if employers or insurance companies could obtain the
results and 85% believe that employers should be prohibited from obtaining genetic information about
employees).
161. See id. (noting danger to individual's privacy resulting from failure to implement clear
policies regarding use of genetic information). Note that state statutes, the ADA and other regulatory
mechanisms provide some restrictions to such uses by employers. Thus, some of these uses of medical
information by employers may be unlawful. See generally, Hustead & Goldman, supra note 116
(discussing how breaches of confidentility may deter people from seeking genetic testing).
162. Twenty percent require medical information which can be used as a source of genetic
information. See Hustead et al., supra note 117, at 19 (noting that some businesses perform genetic
testing on their employees). The danger of abuse is not a fiction: The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Company was sued in 2001 for secretly testing employees for genetic predisposition to carpal
tunnel syndrome. EEOC v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co., No. 02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386
(E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002). This lawsuit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, was settled
in 2001 when the defendant agreed to stop secret genetic testing of its employees. Kristen Philipkoski,
Genetic Testing Case Settled, WIRED NEWS (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wired.com/news/
technology/0,1282,42971,00.html.
163. See Schwartz, supra note 158, at 29 (suggesting that employers often use health care
information to make employment decisions). Schwartz notes that according to a 1989 survey
commissioned by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) over one-third of
Fortune 500 companies surveyed in 1995 "admitted to using the medical records of their personnel in
employment-related decisions." This was a decline from previous years when this fraction reached
one-half of the employers. Cancer patients lose their jobs at five times the rate of those without the
disease. Id. See also Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in
GENETIC SECRETS 281 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (noting that employer's collection of medical
information about employees began as early as the turn of the century).
164. See Rothstein, supra note 163, at 282 (observing that employers get employee medical
information from both in-house medical staff and from employees' personal physicians).
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employers. 165 While many of these disclosures have been with the consent of the
patient, secondary or subsequent use of medical information can expose much
more about an individual patient than initially understood when consent was
given. Because objective medical information is essentially immutable, much
can be derived from later retesting of information that was not particularly
sensitive at time of the initial disclosure. 166 For example, blood samples taken to
detect substance abuse could later be retested to detect genetic defects. With the
rapid evolution of medical science, patients cannot really be sure that any
information their physicians release about them to their employers could not
later expose sensitive and damaging information. The privacy of medical
information is thus increasingly at the mercy of technology.
b.

Insurance Companies

As with employers, insurance companies face an increasing incentive to use
previously unavailable genetic information. 167 While the expansion of genetic
tests has obviously not created a higher incidence of genetic disorders, it has
created the ability to identify and exclude high-risk insureds. If an insurance
company can reliably identify potential clients who have an increased chance of
contracting a certain disorder, the company may be able to screen out costly
insureds. 168 One of the primary disincentives for insurance companies to pursue
genetic information has been the prohibitive cost involved and because many of
the disorders occur too infrequently to justify the cost of testing the entire
pool. 169 The wider availability of genetic tests today provides a strong economic
incentive for insurance companies to pursue genetic information on potential
170
insureds.
The incentive to use genetic information could manifest itself not only
through insurance companies requiring genetic tests for coverage, but through
accessing information collected by others as well. 171 Insurance companies can
use even peripheral medical information gathered from physician-supplied
medical records to collect genetic information on a potential insured. 172 This

165. Id.
166. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded Future Diaries,
270 JAMA 2346, 2346-47 (1993) (discussing effects of maintaining DNA databanks).
167. See Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance, in

GENErIC SECRETS 299, 303 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997) (noting that genetic testing may become more
common when "multiplexing" of genetic tests is possible).
168. See id. at 305 (describing dangers of permitting unlimited access to genetic test results).
169. See id. at 303 (explaining why insurers do not conduct routine genetic testing on insurance
applicants).
170. See id. at 303-04 (noting that half of surveyed medical directors of life insurance reported
that they would use genetic testing if the tests have "high sensitivity and specificity and general clinical
acceptance").
171. See id. at 304-05 (noting incentives that can lead insurers to seek genetic information from
applicant's physician).
172. See Kass, supra note 167, at 304 (noting that information contained on patient medical
charts often yield genetic information). Kass gives the example of an insurance company requesting a
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information may be combined with other data and predicative analysis can be
applied to the detriment of the patient.
From the patient's perspective,-insurer access to a-wider scope of medical
information can have devastating effects on the unfortunate individual who has a
genetic defect, disorder, or other "problematic" medical propensities.
Consequently, such an individual could be subjected to higher insurance rates or
denied health or life insurance or access to any insured health services. 173 As an
individual's genetics can expose medical information regarding one's children,
these devastating outcomes could affect family members as well. The resulting
disincentive to entrust full confidence in one's physician cannot be fully
174
addressed by laws prohibiting discrimination based upon medical information.
The remedies available through tort claims or other causes of action against an
employer, insurer, or other third party for wrongfully using medical information
about an individual may provide little solace to the individual whose sensitive
medical information has been exposed to public view or whose children have
been denied health insurance.
5.

Patients Increasingly Engage in Privacy Protective Behavior

The privacy concerns implicated by technological advancements have
changed the thought process in which a patient must undertake when deciding
what and how much personal medical information to disclose to a physician. As
a result, many patients are increasingly engaging in privacy-protective behavior.
This behavior may include such activities as:
[S]witching doctors; paying for health care out-of-pocket; asking a
doctor not to write down certain information in their record or to
record a less serious or embarrassing health condition; giving inaccurate
information in their medical history; or even not seeking medical care in
175
the first place for a health problem.
Privacy-protective behavior in patients reflects the trend toward increased public
awareness and concerns regarding technology's erosion of informational privacy
in general. 76 However, the effect that these concerns have on the physicianpatient relationship is particularly counterproductive and troubling.
While a concrete number of patients who engage in privacy-protective
behavior may be difficult to ascertain, statistics show that the problem is quite

patient's medical records for a disclosed medical condition but ascertaining other genetic information
peripherally from the record. Id.
173. Id. at 305-06.
174. See BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:3 (noting unique sensitivity of healthcare
information).
175. Scott, supra note 139, at 493.
176. See Standards for Privacy II, Fed. Reg. at 82,464 (discussing individuals' right to protect
personal information). HHS cites a 1998 national survey that indicated that 88% of Americans were
concerned about the amount of information being requested by potential employers, telemarketers,
electronic marketers, insurance companies, and health care providers. Id. (citing Privacy and

American Business, 1998 Privacy Concerns & Consumer Choice Survey).
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real. An often-cited statistic indicates that one in six Americans engages in
privacy-protective behavior. 177
Studies have documented that fears of
discrimination from the disclosure of medical information is a significant factor
in patients' willingness to forgo testing and to seek reimbursement from health
insurers. 178 Studies have also shown that, even in the wake of protective federal
medical privacy and state genetic discrimination laws, a substantial number of
patients still believe that their health information has been improperly disclosed
179
by a health care provider, insurance plan, government agency, or employer.
This lack of trust in the confidentiality of health information is reflected in
the 2000 Privacy Rule. Here, HHS noted that the Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons reported that eighty-seven percent of its members had a
patient request that information not be included in his or her records. 80 HHS
also cited a study by the Health Privacy Working Group that concluded that
patients engage in many types of privacy-protective behavior, including
withholding information from doctors, providing inaccurate information, and
181
"doctor-hop[ping] to avoid a consolidated medical record.'
The theoretical calculus that patients must make when determining what
and how much information to reveal to a physician is undeniable. While it is
true that most patients would not withhold information from their physicians
that could compromise their physical health, some patients may choose to
withhold sensitive information because they are more concerned about the
possibility of social stigma from "family members, friends, neighbors, or
colleagues"' 18 and other harmful risks of disclosure, than with effective medical
treatment. 183 However, disincentives to disclosure are not limited to sensitive

177. See Press Release, California HealthCare Foundation, Americans Worry About the Privacy
of Their Computerized Medical Records (Jan. 28, 1999) (suggesting that most Americans would like to
restrict access to their medical records).
178. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients' Fear of
Discriminationby Health Insurers: The View From Genetic Counselors, 28 J. LAW, MED., & ETHIcs
245, 246-57 (2000) (noting patients' fear that health insurers will use genetic information to deny
health insurance).
179. See BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:3 (citing California HealthCare Foundation,
National Survey: Confidentiality of Medical Records (Jan. 1999)). But see 2003 Privacy Trust Survey,
Executive Summary, Ponemon Institute and the CIO Institute of Carnegie Mellon University (Oct.
2003) (ranking businesses and government organizations according to "privacy trust scores"), available
at http://cioi.web.cmu.edu/research/2003PrivacyTrustSurveyExecutiveSummary.pdf.
The survey
evaluated individuals' "trust" with respect to protecting the privacy of personal information and
revealed that healthcare providers enjoy the highest "privacy trust scores" of the twenty-six
organizations included on the survey instrument. Id. at 1. Grocery stores and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security received the lowest "privacy trust scores." Id. at 2.
180. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82,467 (outlining steps that patients take to protect medical information).
181. Id. (citing Health Privacy Working Group, Best Principles for Health Privacy (July, 1999)).
182. See BOYLE & MACK, supra note 91, at 1:3 (noting disclosure can result in "social or
psychological harm, be stigmatizing, and cause embarrassment, social isolation, or a loss of selfesteem").
183. See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 157, at 263 (noting that in addition to employers
and insurers, creditors may have an interest in genetic or medical information because "one who has a
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information. As there are more types of medical information stored than in the
past, patients may legitimately fear that even innocuous information may
inferentially reveal damaging information. Depending upon who discovers the
particular information (for example, spouses, friends, or employers), the harm
that results from disclosure and dissemination could include severe emotional,
marital discord, loss of
social, or -economic injury, embarrassment, humiliation,
184
reputation, and even loss of a job or insurance.
The evolution of medical and computer science has made patients
increasingly likely to err on the side of caution with respect to disclosures to their
185
Patients confront
physician when the stakes of such disclosures are unknown.
them, where the
about
more
know
a world where their health care providers
databases, where
centralized
in
health care providers are storing this information
and where
information,
this
to
access
an increasing number of individuals have
private
out
seek
to
parties
third
for
there'are increasing financial incentives
medical information.
As technology continues to evolve, the actual dangers that patients face
from disclosure of their health information may. be incapable of precise
However, whether technology has actually made health
identification.
information less secure may be beside the point if patients perceive their
information as less secure. Americans are more technologically savvy than ever
before. 186 However, the public is also confronted with news stories about abuse
187
of information technology, electronic identity theft, and cyber-terrorism.
Patients walking into a typical physician's office will likely be cognizant of the
fact that the information about them is being stored electronically and will react
accordingly. While some patients may not be concerned with disclosures, others
will.
In the context of the physician-patient privilege, these new reservations,
whether realistic or not, threaten to do irreparable damage to the physician-

high risk of contracting a fatal disorder may not be worth the risk of lending money to").
184. Scott, supra note 139, at 492 (explaining that fear of disclosure has numerous negative
impacts such as impairment of doctor-patient relationship).
185. See id. at 485, 492-93 (noting study where 1 in 6 Americans engages in such "privacyprotecting behaviors" as switching doctors, giving inadequate medical information, and avoiding
doctors altogether).
186. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82,465 (noting that "[Almericans have embraced the use of the Internet and other forms of electronic
information"). The 2000 HIPAA Privacy Rule preamble cites statistics that indicate that 60% of
Americans surveyed have a computer in their home, 82% reported having used a computer, 64% have
used the Internet, and 58% have sent an e-mail. Id. at 82,466.
187. Id. at 82,465. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, cyber-terrorism "is
terrorism that initiates, or threatens to initiate, the exploitation of or attack on information systems."
John F. Lewis, Jr., Fighting Terrorism in the 21' Century, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin No. 3, at 6
(March 1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1999/mar99leb.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2004). See also J. Graham, Computer Dictionary (updated 2001), available at www.nystar.com/
dictionary/ad.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (defining cyber-terrorism as "[dieliberately interfering
with the Internet or other information system with the purpose of causing widespread fear. May
involve using computers to ultimately cause harm to people or their property").
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patient relationship. These days, patients have a stronger motivation than ever
before to jealously guard their medical information. The "mere possibility 188
that extremely sensitive information could be disclosed is increasingly damaging
the physician-patient relationship in the absence of a physician-patient privilege.
Further, as medical science continues to evolve, this rift in the physician-patient
relationship will likely become more severe. It is in this context that the need for
a federal physician-patient privilege must be weighed.
C.

What Does HIPAA Mean To The FederalPhysician-PatientPrivilege?

Evidentiary privileges were disfavored at common law as being contrary to
the maxim that the public has a right to "every man's evidence.' '189 However,
the evolution of privileges has created important exceptions to this general
proposition.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("FRE 501") governs the
development of federal evidentiary privileges. 19° This rule calls for the creation
of privileges by two different methods: (1) explicit recognition "by Act of
Congress"191; or (2) through "principles of... common law.., interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. '192
HIPAA has a prominent role in establishing the physician-patient privilege
by both of these means. First, HIPAA is rightly understood as an "Act of
Congress" that establishes a physician-patient privilege. Second, HIPAA
represents a comprehensive and strong federal policy of confidentiality of
medical information that unambiguously provides the federal "reason and
experience" to establish a foundation for a physician-patient privilege under
FRE 501 using the model established in Jaffee v. Redmond. 193
II. HIPAA

IS AN

"ACT

OF CONGRESS" THAT ESTABLISHES AN EVIDENTIARY

PRIVILEGE UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501

The sections relevant, to this inquiry are section 264(c)(2) (the preemption
provision) of HIPAA and section 164.512(e) of the HIPAA Privacy Rule

188. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
189. Id. at 9 (noting that, historically, exemptions from testifying were exceptional).
190. FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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94
Section 264(c)(2) provides
(standards for disclosure in judicial proceedings).'
that HIPAA's provisions "shall not supersede a contrary provision of State law,
if the provision of State lawimposes requirements, standards, or implementation
specifications that are more stringent than the requirements, standards, or
' 195
A state law is
implementation specifications imposed under [HIPAA].
"contrary" to HIPAA when "[a] covered entity would find it impossible to
96
"A state privacy law is
comply with both the State and federal requirements."'
"more stringent" than a HIPAA requirement if the state law prohibits or
which such use or disclosure
restricts a use or disclosure in circumstances under
1 97
otherwise would be permitted under HIPAA."'

HIPAA's preemption scheme is unusual, however. Generally, federal laws
that contain a preemption provision will provide that the federal law, by virtue of
1 98
HIPAA's scheme essentially
the Supremacy Clause, trumps the state law.
state law if the state privacy
preempt
not
do
provisions
reverses this. HIPAA's
199
In fact, HIPAA itself
requirements.
HIPAA's
than
stringent"
law is "more
and state court
federal
both
in
use
for
laws
privacy
to
state
gives effect
more stringent
and
provides
HIPAA
to
contrary
law
is
state
the
if
proceedings
2
protections of privacy. 00
This preemption scheme applies to all of HIPAA's privacy regulations,
including section 164.512(e) of the Privacy Rule, which governs the standards for
2 1
Although somewhat
disclosure in federal and state judicial proceedings.
ambiguous on its face as to whether HIPAA's preemption provision applies to
cases involving federal question jurisdiction, HHS seemed to indicate the
application of this provision to federal question proceedings in the preamble to
the Privacy Rule.20 2 In addressing the concerns about "whether a subpoena in a
federal civil action would require disclosure if a state law prohibit[ed] the release
of [medical information]," ' 203 HHS responded:
Under the applicable preemption provisions of HIPAA, state laws
relating to the privacy of medical information that are more stringent
than the federal rules are not preempted. To the extent that an
applicable state law precludes disclosure of protected health
information that would otherwise be permitted under the final rule,

194. HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2033-34; 45 C.F.R § 164.512(e).
195. Id. § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2033-34 (emphasis added).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1).
197. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-C-55, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *8 (N.D. Ill.

Feb. 5, 2004) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 160.202).
198. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1701, at *13 (citing Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Bie,
340 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2003)).
199. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b).
200. HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2033-34.
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).
202. See Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,677 (discussing whether state privacy laws
would be applied in federal actions).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
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state law governs.
While HHS theoretically could have been referring solely to preemption in
federal diversity jurisdiction cases there was no such distinction made in either
the text of the Privacy Rule or in HHS's commentary. 205 If HHS had intended
for these provisions to only apply to a specific subset of federal jurisdiction, it
could have clearly expressed this intention. In the absence of this expression,
HHS's general language must be interpreted broadly. 206 Consequently, it
appears that HHS intended sections 164.512(e) and 264(c)(2) to apply equally in
all federal and state suits.
Thus, sections 164.512(e) and 264(c)(2) will cause state privilege laws to be
applied that are "more stringent" than federal protections of medical privacy,
even in the context of a federal question case. 207 While normally, under FRE
501, state law would govern in proceedings where state law supplies the rule of
decision and federal law would govern in proceedings where federal law provides
the rule of decision, this only holds true if not otherwise "provided [for] by [an]
Act of Congress. 120 8 Congress explicitly provided that state privilege laws were
to preempt HIPAA in all. cases, state. and federal, when they provided "more
stringent" protections of privacy.209 Essentially, HIPAA has enacted a privacy
protective scheme whereby "more stringent" state laws are an integral part of
the federal government's medical privacy policy. This establishes a privilege in
two different ways: (1) section 164.512(e) is the general privilege that governs
the use of protected health information in federal judicial proceedings; but (2) if
state law happens to provide greater. protections than HIPAA would, state
privilege law will trump the general federal privilege in section 164.512(e) and
provide the privilege that governs the nondisclosure of protected health
information.21 0
Whether HHS and Congress intended to create an evidentiary privilege via
these sections is not entirely unambiguous. In National Abortion Federation v.
Ashcrof, 211 Chief Judge Charles Kocoras of the Northern District of Illinois felt
these sections were rightly understood as an "Act of Congress" under FRE 501
because "[i]f the case were otherwise, Congress' directive to [HHS] to set
standards and regulations 'with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable
health information'.., would be rendered meaningless. '212 Thus, Judge
204. Id.

205. HIPAA § 264(c)(2); Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,462.
206. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000)
(deferring to the canon of statutory construction that the specific rules the general, the court refused to
add to the specific requirements of a federal statute).
207. See United States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24062, at
*15-16 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2002) (recognizing that Louisiana privilege law would not apply to federal
qui tam action because it was not "more stringent" under HIPAA).
208. FED. R. EviD. 501 (explaining when federal or state privilege rules should be applied).
209. HIPAA § 264(c)(2); 45 C.F.R § 160.203(b).
210. HIPAA § 264(c)(2); 45 C.F.R §§ 160.203(b), 164.512(e).
211. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701.
212. Nat'lAbortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *15.
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Kocoras applied "more stringent" Illinois privacy laws, including the Illinois
physician-patient privilege, 213 to a purely federal question case.214 Judge
Kocoras noted that "because Illinois' privacy protections are activated only
through HIPAA's anti-preemption provision, this is not a case of Illinois law
215
trumping federal law but instead a case of one federal law displacing another."
He contended that the application of the Illinois physician-patient privilege to
this federal suit was "Congress' desired outcome" in enacting HIPAA's privacy
protections for medical information. 216 Kocoras noted that FRE 501 specifically
ratified this scheme of privacy protections because as an "Act of Congress,"
HIPAA could clearly permit state laws to provide the rule of decision in a
217
federal question case.
On appeal, while affirming the District Court on other grounds, Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Judge
Kocoras's reading of HIPAA. 218 Posner noted that "although the issue is not
free from doubt, ' 219 he believed that section 164.512(e) was simply "a procedure
for obtaining authority to use medical records in litigation" 220 rather than an
independent evidentiary privilege. 221 He observed that "[tlhe enforcement of
federal law might be hamstrung if state-law privileges more stringent than any
federal privilege ... were applicable to all federal cases." 222 He added that it
seemed "improbable that HHS intended to open such a can of worms" by
He advanced two
establishing a new federal evidentiary privilege.2 23
justifications for this reading. First, section 164.512(e)(1)(iii)(B) requires notice
to a patient be given "to permit the individual to raise an objection to the
court. '224 Posner noted that these objections would often be based on privileges
"found elsewhere than in the regulations themselves." 225 Second, he argued that
the procedural character of section 164.512(e) was indicated by the fact that the
"more stringent" clause applies only to "individually identifiable health
2 26
information" rather than health information in general.

213. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2003).

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *12.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *15-17.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923,925 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 925.
Id. at 926 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii)(B)).
Id.
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203(b), 164.514(a)) (emphasis added).
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A. Congress Invited HHS To Create A Privilege To Govern The Uses and
Disclosures Of Protected Health Information In JudicialProceedings

Judge Kocoras's 'eading; of 'section :164.512(e), however, is the more
appropriate and correct reading. Perhaps Judge Posner felt it improper to use
this case to address the complexity of the evidentiary issues because this

particular appeal had been "accelerated '227 and was a "summary...
proceeding."' 228 Contrary to Judge Posner's views, we maintain that Congress
and HHS furnished a firm basis for an evidentiary privilege and that this
privilege should be acknowledged and followed in all future federal court
proceedings.
Congress gave HHS a mandate to set "standardswith respect to the privacy
of individually identifiable health information. ' 229 Congress further explained
what it had in mind for the HIPAA Privacy Rule by further directing HHS to
address "the uses and disclosures of such information that should be authorized
or required. 2 30 HHS responded. with the facially unambiguous section
164.512(e), 231 entitled "Standard: disclosures for judicial and administrative
227. Id. at 924.
228. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 926.
229. HIPAA § 264(a) (emphasis added).
230. HIPAA § 264(b) (emphasis added).
231. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). Section 164.512(e) reads:
e) Standard: Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings.
(1) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose protected health information in the
course of any judicial or administrative proceeding:
(i) In response to an order of a court or administrative tribunal, provided that the covered
entity discloses only the protected health information expressly authorized by such order; or
(ii) In response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process, that is not
accompanied by an order of a court or administrative tribunal, if:
(A) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance, as described in paragraph (e)(1)(iii)
of this section, from the party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been
made by such party to ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected health
information that has been requested has been given notice of the request; or
(B) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance, as described in paragraph (e)(1)(iv)
of this section, from the party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been
made by such party to secure a qualified protective order that meets the requirements of
paragraph e)(1)(v) of this section.
(iii) For the purposes of paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(A) of this section, a covered entity receives
satisfactory assurances from a party seeking protecting health information if the covered
entity receives from such party a written statement and accompanying documentation
demonstrating that:
(A) The party requesting such information has made a good faith attempt to provide written
notice to the individual (or, if the individual's location is unknown, to mail a notice to the
individual's last known address);
(B) The notice included sufficient information about the litigation or proceeding in which
the protected health information is requested to permit the individual to raise an objection
to the court or administrative tribunal; and
(C) The time for the individual to raise objections to the court or administrative tribunal has
elapsed, and:
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proceedings."' 232 Section 164.512(e) establishes the standards that HIPAA
mandates for "when a covered entity is permitted to disclose protected health
information in response to requests for protected health information that are
made in the course of judicial... proceedings."'2 33 No distinction whatsoever is
made between state and federal proceedings.
The Privacy Rule requires a court order or other privacy protective criteria
to be met2 34 before the covered entity can disclose the information for use in
court. 235 HHS made clear that, in the event that disclosure is permitted under
section 164.512(e), the covered entity may "disclose only that protected health
information that is within the scope of the permitted disclosure." 236 Essentially,

(1) No objections were filed; or
(2) All objections filed by the individual have been resolved by the court or the
administrative tribunal and the disclosures being sought are consistent with such resolution.
(iv) For the purposes of paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(B) of this section, a covered entity receives
satisfactory assurances from a party seeking protected health information, if the covered
entity receives from such party a written statement and accompanying documentation
demonstrating that:
(A) The parties to the dispute giving rise to the request for information have agreed to a
qualified protective order and have presented it to the court or administrative tribunal with
jurisdiction over the dispute; or
(B) The party seeking the protected health information has requested a qualified order
from such court or administrative tribunal.
(v) For purposes of paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a qualified protective order means, with
respect to protected health information requested under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section,
an order of a court or of an administrative tribunal or a stipulation by the parties to the
litigation or administrative proceeding that:
(A) Prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the protected health information for any
purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for which such information was requested;
and
(B) Requires the return to the covered entity or destruction of the protected health
information (including all copies made) at the end of the litigation or proceeding.
(vi) Notwithstanding paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section, a covered entity may disclose
protected health information ih response to lawful process described in paragraph
(e)(1)(ii) of this section without receiving satisfactory assurance under paragraph
(e)(1)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section, if the covered entity makes reasonable efforts to provide
notice to the individual sufficient to meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this
section or to seek a qualified protective order sufficient to meet the requirements of
paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section.
(2) Other uses and disclosures under this section. The provisions of this paragraph do not
supersede other provisions of this section that otherwise permit or restrict uses or disclosures
of protected health information.
232. Id.
233. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed Reg. at 82,529.
234. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (providing for disclosure in response to a subpoena or
discovery request if satisfactory assurances that reasonable efforts have been made to give the
individual whose information has been requested notice of the request or satisfactory assurances that
the party seeking such information has made reasonable efforts to secure a protective order that will
guard the confidentiality of the information).
235. Id.
236. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,530.
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Congress delegated authority to HHS to promulgate regulations that would set
standards governing the privacy of individually identifiable health information
for the use and disclosure of protected health information in judicial
proceedings. The Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of this broad
delegation to HHS as "a statement of 'general policy' by Congress." 237 Thus, it is
clear that HHS had full authority and support from Congress to establish an
evidentiary privilege. In other words, it is not at all "improbable" that HHS
would have responded to Congress' clear mandate by promulgating exactly what
was asked for.
While HHS did not explicitly state that an evidentiary privilege was being
created under section 164.512(e), this was the clear intent. It is difficult to
imagine what else Congress could possibly have had in mind when directing
HHS. to promulgate "standards" governing the "uses and disclosures" of
protected health information. 238 If, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, that this
was simply a "procedure for obtaining authority to use medical records in
litigation," 239 it would have seemed more logical for HHS to have entitled
section 512(e) "procedures: disclosures in judicial proceedings."
Use of
standards implies that some qualitative judgment (a concept consistent with an
evidentiary privilege rather than a procedure) is being made about the subject
240
matter.
Beyond speculative construction of what "standards" means, however, the
most powerful evidence that an evidentiary privilege was intended is the effect of
a contrary finding. If, in fact, section 512(e) were simply a procedure for
disclosures in judicial proceedings, HHS would have neglected in the significant
arena of judicial proceedings to fulfill the mandate that Congress gave HHS to
develop "standards" for "uses and disclosures" of protected health information.
In other words, there would be a significant gap in HIPAA's applicability in the
courtroom, thereby allowing otherwise protected health information to be
disclosed to the public in court, thus defeating the policies underlying HIPAA.
In the context of Congress's clear mandate, this seems unlikely. As Judge
Charles Kocoras correctly noted, such an outcome would render Congress'
241
mandate "meaningless."
B. HHS Responded To Congress' Invitation By CreatingA FederalPhysicianPatientPrivilege
Beyond the clear language of section 512(e), HHS has given more
indications that it intended to create a federal physician-patient evidentiary
privilege. First, in responding to those who "urged the Secretary to revise
[section 512(e)] to state that it does not preempt or supersede existing rules and
237. S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346,351 (4th Cir. 2003).
238. HIPAA § 264(a), (b)(3).
239. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 926.
240. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (8th ed. 2004) (defining standard as a "criterion for

measuring acceptability, quality, or accuracy").
241. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *15.
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statutes governing judicial proceedings, including rules of evidence, procedure,
and discovery," 242 HHS declined to include any such provision. 243 Instead, HHS
reiterated that the Privacy Rule's preemption provision, 244 which gives effect to
more stringent state privilege laws under HIPAA, would continue to govern
judicial disclosure. 245 Thus, when directly asked to state that section 164.512(e)
did not establish an evidentiary privilege, HHS refused to do so.
Second, section 164.512(e), consistent with an evidentiary privilege,
establishes affirmative standards for disclosure of individually identifiable health
information rather than simply establishing a procedure for disclosure. Thus,
Judge Posner's dismissal of section 164.512(e) as a source of a privilege is not
well founded. HHS explicitly noted that because protected health information
"may be critical evidence," section 164.512(e) "balance[d] the need for the
information with the individual's privacy." 246 If this section were simply a
procedure rather than an affirmative standard, there would not seem to be a
need for any substantive balancing of interests. The standard of section
164.512(e) is essentially to further the basic principle of nondisclosure to third
parties of HIPAA's other provisions in the context of the courtroom. 247 In other
words, section 164.512(e) requires application of the aggregate of HIPAA's
privacy protections in the context of judicial proceedings. This could be
accomplished through either HIPAA's numerous affirmative standards or, in
cases where state law provides greater protection than these minimum standards,
through HIPAA's preemption provision giving effect to these state privileges
instead. As HIPAA itself provides innumerable substantive protections of
health information, it would have been redundant for HHS to reiterate in section
164.512(e) every single affirmative standard that applies to judicial proceedings.
The source of the privilege is the HIPAA regulations themselves. It is
undisputed that HIPAA provides affirmative standards for disclosure of
protected health information. 248 Section 164.512(e) simply established that these
standards apply in the context of state and federal lawsuits. In any event, this is
substantive rather than procedural.
Consistent with this concept, HHS reiterated, in response to comments that
section 164.512(e) should require rather than permit disclosure of protected
health information, that "a presumption is established that the data contained in
an individual's medical record belongs to the individual and must be protected
from disclosure to third parties." 249 In response to comments suggesting "that
disclosure of protected health information should be limited only to those cases
242. Standards for Privacy 1L 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,674.
243. Id.

244. HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2033.
245. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,674.
246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. See id. at 82,677 (noting that court order should not compromise presumption that
individuals' medical records are private).
248. See id. at 82,679 (describing the showing that is necessary for a covered entity to release
protected health information).
249. Id. at 82,677.
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in which the individual has consented or a court order has been issued
compelling disclosure, '250 HHS rejected this suggestion on the grounds that state
privacy laws were not even this strict.251 If section 164.512(e) did not establish
affirmative standards for disclosure, it would seem odd to compare the strength
of its protections with state privacy law.
Third, section 164.512(e) operates identically to an evidentiary privilege.
HHS noted that this new rule would not interfere with the judicial practice of
requiring an individual who is a party to a proceeding and has put his or her
medical condition at issue to consent to disclosure of medical information in
order to prevail in the suit. 252 This operates similarly to the waiver of an
evidentiary privilege when an individual places his or her health at issue in a
lawsuit.
Fourth, Judge Posner's dismissal of the substantive character of section
164.512(e)'s protections because the "more stringent" clause applies only to
"individually identifiable health information," 253 rather than health information
in general, is not fatal to the establishment of a privilege. An evidentiary
privilege need not cover every conceivable communication between the holder
and non-holder of the privilege. For example, the attorney-client privilege does
not cover statements made by the client to the attorney, even though in
254
confidence, if the purpose of the communication is to further crime or fraud.
Consequently, Judge Posner's summary dismissal of the presence of an
evidentiary privilege under these sections is not well founded and should not be
followed by other courts that consider the matter.
In sum, while the issue may not be entirely "free from doubt, '255 it seems
significantly more likely that HHS, pursuant to its broad mandate from Congress
to create standards for "uses and disclosures,"' 256 promulgated affirmative
standards for disclosure of individually identifiable health information in judicial
proceedings. While HHS's failure to explicitly call section 164.512(e) an
evidentiary privilege leaves some room for technical disagreement, the Seventh
Circuit's reading of section 164.512(e) as simply "a procedure for obtaining
authority to use medical records in litigation" 257 is implausible and labored. This
reading is not only inconsistent with HHS's explanation of section 164.512(e),
but it would serve to render Congress' unambiguous mandate to HHS, to
promulgate standards for "uses and disclosures," meaningless. Congress and
HHS seem to have already created an evidentiary privilege through operation of
HIPAA as an "Act of Congress" under FRE 501.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Standards for Privacy 11, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,675..
Id.
Id. at 82,530.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 926 (emphasis added).
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1933).
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 925.
HIPAA § 264(b)(3).
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 926.
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III. HIPAA ILLUSTRATES THAT A FEDERAL PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IS
MANDATED BY REASON AND EXPERIENCE
Even if HIPAA cannot be read as establishing an evidentiary privilege asan
"Act of Congress," HIPAA still plays a prominent role in the foundation of a
federal physician-patient privilege pursuant to FRE 501 that states: "the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience."258 HIPAA provides the backdrop for finding a physician-patient
privilege illustrating both the reason and experience factors required under FRE
501. HIPAA illustrates the changed medical' environment (the "reason") and
the policy supporting strong and unambiguous protection of health information
privacy (the "experience") Under which the federal physician-patient privilege
must be evaluated. Applying the mandate of FRE 501 as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond to "continue the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges,"259 there is ample
foundation for a federal physician-patient privilege.
A. How is a Privilege Recognized Under the Principlesof "Reason and
Experience"?
The foundation for new evidentiary privileges was not intended to remain
static. 260 Federal courts have a right and a responsibility to examine policies
behind federal common law privileges and to alter or amend them when reason
and experience so demand. 261 Congress intended federal courts to recognize
privileges based upon changed societal conditions. 262 Applying this mandate of
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
existence of a psychotherapist-privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.263 The method
used in Jaffee to establish the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
provides the model for future recognition of other federal evidentiary privileges.
The Court, in Jaffee, began its analysis by reiterating the intent underlying
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: the law governing federal evidentiary privileges is
not to be frozen at any particular period in history. 264 Federal courts are
directed to "continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges"

258. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).

259. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980)). Common law recognized the attorney-client privilege and a rule of incompetence with respect
to the husband and wife relationship. This rule of incompetence later evolved to become the federally
recognized marital privilege via the Supreme Court's holding in Trammel. Id.
260. See id. at 8-9 (explaining that common law and recognition of privilege should be flexible).
261. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975).
262. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8 ("[Tlhe common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions." (quoting Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12
(1934))).
263. Id. at 10.
264. Id. at 9.
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where the need for the new privilege outweighs the cost in the loss of reliable
265
evidence that the privilege would entail.
The Jaffee Court unambiguously stated that the general disfavor of
testimonial privileges may be justified "by a 'public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.' ' 2 66 In other words, if there are sufficiently important private and public
interests in protecting the relationship in which certain confidential
communications take place, a court may find that the communications made
within that relationship should be protected from disclosure in open court. The
Jaffee Court weighed the merits of the psychotherapist-patient relationship in
this context and concluded that both "reason and experience" compelled the
267
recognition of an absolute privilege in this relationship.
1. "Reason and Experience" Under Jaffee
The "reason and experience" analysis used by the Jaffee Court looked to
the logical basis for justifying recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
as well as the underlying policies And actions taken by state legislatures to
determine that confidential communications made between patients and their
psychotherapists "are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence." 268 In order for a new privilege to be recognized
under the Jaffee Court's interpretation of FRE 501's "reason and experience"
test, several elements must be established and balanced. First, it must be shown
that the new privilege advances private interests. 269 Second, the new privilege
must also advance public interests.270 Third, these private and public interests
must outweigh any potential loss of evidence that flows from the new
privilege. 271 Finally, a showing that there exists a consensus among states
27 2
recognizing the privilege must be factored into the analysis.
a. An Evidentiary Privilege Must Serve Private Interests
The Jaffee Court reasoned that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was
"rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust. '273 It acknowledged
that effective psychotherapy is dependent on an atmosphere of confidentiality

265. Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
266. Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
267. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-10.
268. Id. at 15.
269. See id. at 11 (discussing importance of serving private interests).
270. See id. (discussing importance of serving public ends).
271. See id. (noting that "the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the
privilege is modest").
272. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13 ("[W]e recognized that it is appropriate to treat a consistent
body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience."' (citing
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 376-81 (1933))).
273. Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
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where a patient is willing to make a complete disclosure of facts. 27 4 As the
disclosure of the inherently sensitive information related to psychotherapy could
potentially cause embarrassment to the patient, 275 the mere possibility of
disclosure could damage the basic structure of this relationship. 276 By protecting
the relationship and confidential communications between patients and
psychotherapists from "involuntary disclosure," the Court held that the
277
psychotherapist-patient privilege "thus serves important private interests."
b.

An Evidentiary PrivilegeMust Serve Public Ends

The Jaffee Court reasoned that any recognized privilege must also "serve
public ends." 278 The Court analogized the societal benefits of establishing
attorney-client privilege, which promotes the public's interest in the observance
of law and administration of justice, 279 and the marital privilege, which promotes
the societal interest in marital harmony, 280 to that of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 281 Under the facts of Jaffee, the Court observed that recognizing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege would produce benefits that inure to the whole
community. 282 The psychotherapist-patient privilege serves public ends by
facilitating and encouraging the treatment of individuals with emotional or
mental health problems. 283 Taking into account the gravity of the societal
interest in mental health, the Court recognized the "transcendent" importance of
the mental health of the country's citizenry. 284 It is important to note in the
context of this article that, in recognizing the "transcendent" importance of the
mental health of the citizenry, the Court implicitly recognized that the physical
285
health of the citizenry is of "transcendent" importance as well.
c. Public and Private Interests From an Evidentiary PrivilegeMust Outweigh
the PotentialLoss of Relevant Evidence
The Jaffee Court balanced the possible evidentiary loss that would result
from recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 286 The Court concluded
that denying the psychotherapist-patient privilege would not result in any
significant evidentiary loss because patients would likely cease sharing

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
278. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981)).
279. Id. (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
280. Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53).
281. Id.
282. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 11 (noting that "[tihe mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical

health, is a public good of transcendent importance").
286. Id.
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information that could be used to their detriment. 287 Thus, this "unspoken
'evidence"' would not result in any significant evidentiary loss. 288 Therefore, the
cost of the privilege was minimal, as the privilege would protect only those
communications that are generated by a reliance on confidentiality. On the
balance, the public and private interests at stake outweighed any possible loss of
evidence.
d. Influence of Previous Policy Decisions Under Jaffee
The Jaffee Court attached particular importance to the policy decisions of
the individual states in recognizing a new privilege. 289 The Court observed that
prior to the instant case, the legislatures of fifty states and the District of
Columbia had enacted statutes recognizing some form of psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 290 The existence of this overwhelming consensus indicated that federal
recognition of this privilege was necessary as well. 291 The Court noted that the
existence of a state privilege would have little value in encouraging candor to
292
one's psychotherapist if confidentiality would not be honored in federal court.
Federal court denial of an asserted privilege that is recognized by a "consensus"
of states would result in the frustration of the original purpose of state legislation
created to encourage confidential communications. 293 This potential conflict
created an impermissible situation for the Supreme Court, mitigating in favor of
recognizing a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The Jaffee Court acknowledged that the primary source of modern privilege
law is legislative rather than judicial action. 294 Legislative development of an
asserted privilege would also explain the absence of federal common law with
respect to any given privilege. 295 Although the language in Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 speaks in terms of growth of privileges being "governed by the
principles of the common law," 296 the driving force in the establishment of new
privileges is more likely to come from the legislature rather than the courts. The
Court explained that legislatures (at least in the case of psychotherapy) are able
to rapidly see the wisdom of and need for new privileges to meet the ever297
changing needs of a society.
Finally, the Jaffee Court recognized that "[t]he uniform judgment of the
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
See id. at 12-13 (emphasizing States' unanimous enactment of psychotherapist privilege).
Id at 12.
See id. at 13 (noting that consensus suggested that privilege was supported by reason and

experience).

292. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See id. (noting that "once a state legislature has enacted a privilege there is no longer an
opportunity for common-law creation of the protection").
296. FED. R. EVID. 501.
297. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14 (citing quick action of state lawmakers to create unanimous
acceptance).
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States is reinforced by the fact that a psychotherapist privilege was among the
nine specific privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee in its
proposed privilege rules. '298 It relied on the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence in evaluating the "experience" factor of Federal Rule of Evidence
501.299 However, the Jaffee Court proceeded to go beyond the scope of
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to hold that communications with
clinical social workers were privileged communications as well. 300 In this way,
Jaffee extended the new privilege to foster a relationship that was supported by
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and beyond to a relationship not
supported by the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. Revolutionary Changes Since Jaffee
We would be remiss not to acknowledge the Jaffee Court's dictum, which at
least implicitly rejected the need for a physician-patient privilege. The Court
observed that "[t]reatment by a physician for physical ailments can often
proceed successfully on the basis of a. physical examination, 30objective
1
information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests."
While the Jaffee Court's characterization of the physician-patient
relationship was a bit myopic, even in 1996, there have been revolutionary
changes in medicine, science, technology, health care organization, and
governmental policy since 1996 that confirm the need for a federal physicianpatient privilege. As discussed supra, scientific and technological changes have
altered the calculus in which patients must engage when communicating with
their physicians. 3°2 There is more information collected from individuals during
the course of medical diagnosis and treatment than ever before. Medical
information is increasingly collected and stored electronically in centralized
locations leading to greater authorized and unauthorized access by more
individuals and entities than in the past. More conclusions can be drawn (both
directly and inferentially) about an individual from medical information. There
are more incentives for commercial and noncommercial uses for medical
information today than in the past-uses that can be damaging to the privacy and
reputation of the patient. Absent strong, protections for medical privacy,
patients may engage in privacy protective behavior when communicating with
As a result, patients may decide not to disclose potentially
physicians.
embarrassing information to their physicians. Moreover, patients may refuse to
seek treatment for certain conditions fearing that medical information may be
disclosed in a manner that will ultimately harm them. These changes modify the
physician-patient dynamic and call for a reevaluation by the federal courts of the

298. Id.
299. Id. at 13-14.
300. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 (recognizing that reasons for applying privilege to psychiatrists and
psychologists applied equally to social workers practicing psychotherapy).
301. Id. at 10.
302. See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text (discussing patients' privacy protective
behavior).
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need for a physician-patient privilege.
B.

The Jaffee Court's Interpretationof "Reason and Experience" Dictates
Recognition of a FederalPhysician-PatientEvidentiary Privilege

The Jaffee Court distinguished the physician-patient relationship fr6m the
psychotherapist-patient relationship noting that physicians can effectively treat
patients on the basis of "physical examination, objective information supplied by
the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests," 30 3 rather than requiring candor
and cooperation from the patient for effective diagnosis and treatment. 3°4 This
basic assumption was and remains fallacious. The veracity of this assumption
was questioned even when Jaffee was decided in 1996.305 In light of the
revolutionary changes in science, technology, medicine, and governmental policy
since Jaffee, clearly a federal physician-patient privilege is now essential to
realize and maximize both individual and public health interests.
There are a number of problems in applying the Jaffee Court's dismissive
analysis to the current state of the patient-physician relationship. First, there are
facets of this relationship that do, in fact, require direct disclosure by the patient
of private facts to facilitate effective diagnosis and treatment. Examples include
conditions that rely on patients' subjective manifestations of symptoms, such as
those involving physical pain, 30 6 or conditions having psychological or emotional
components, such as depression. 30 7 As HHS stated in the 2000 Privacy Rule,
"the entire health care system is built upon the willingness of individuals to share
the most intimate details of their lives with their health care providers." 30 8 Such
willingness is put at risk when confidential information remains unprotected.
Second, the Jaffee Court assumed that patients would actually consent to
"diagnostic tests." 30 9 To the contrary, "[platients are less likely to divulge
sensitive information to health professionals if they are not assured that their
confidences will be respected." 310 If patients refuse to participate in diagnostic
tests out of fear that their physicians could reveal the results, 311 the ability of

303. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
304. Id.
305. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-TestimonialPrivileges and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 769, 807 (2002) (noting that the distinction between
physical and mental examination is questionable).
306. See id. at 807 (citing James S. Lapcevic, Pain Management, in AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
LEGAL MEDICINE, LEGAL MEDICINE ch. 37 (1998)).
307. See AMrrAI ETzIONI, THE LIMIrS OF PRIVACY 146 (1999) (noting that threat of disclosure of
emotional problems deters patients from seeking treatment).
308. Standards for Privacy 11, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,467.
309. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
310. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy,80 CORNELL L. REV. 451,490-91 (1995).
311. As discussed supra, this is not simply theoretical. Studies have documented that fears of
discrimination from the disclosure of medical information is a significant factor in patients' willingness
to undergo testing and to seek reimbursement from health insurers. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S.
Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients' Fear of Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View From
Genetic Counselors,28 J. LAW, MED., & ETHICs 245, 245-57 (2000) (discussing patients' fear of losing
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physicians to treat patients effectively would be hindered. In other words, a
physician may not have sufficient information from which to form an accurate
diagnosis. Consequently, this refusal to submit to tests can have deleterious
312
effects on both the individual health of the patient and on public health.
An effective physician-patient relationship depends on an atmosphere
where a patient is willing to make a complete disclosure of facts and submit to all
beneficial medical procedures. 313 Patients' fears of disclosure, dissemination, or
misuse of their medical information can have a deadly effect on the physicianpatient relationship. 314 While not all patients will allow fears of disclosure to
affect their relationship with their physician, as the Jaffee Court properly
recognized, the "mere possibility" of disclosure of sensitive information might
315
In the absence of
harm a relationship that is built on trust and confidence.
adequate legal protection for medical information, including a federal physicianportion of the public will continue to engage in
patient privilege, a significant 316
"privacy protective behavior."
Ultimately, these individuals are risking their
health in response to privacy concerns. Given the public health concerns such
317
the
avoidance raises, including the threat of uncontrolled pandemics,
consequences of patients engaging in privacy protective behavior in response to
the absence of a federal physician-patient privilege are ominous. As discussed
infra, institutionalizing a federal physician-patient privilege would serve
significant private and public interests. 318 The resultant loss of evidence in court
proceedings would be minimal or nonexistent. In addition, there is a body of
federal and state policy decisions that support recognition of a federal physicianpatient privilege. 319 Thus, under the rationale of Jaffee v. Redmond, "reason and
insurance coverage after undergoing genetic testing).
312. For example, if a patient forgoes medical testing or treatment for HIV/AIDS, the patient's
condition may go undiagnosed and he or she may spread the infection to others. See generally
Anthony L. Osterlund, The Unequal Balancing Act Between HIV-Positive Patients and Physicians,25
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 149 (1999) (noting that patients do not have a duty to inform physicians of HIV
status); Francoise Gilbert, Emerging Issues in Global AIDS Policy: Preserving Privacy,25 WHITTIER
L. REV. 273 (2003) (noting importance of safeguarding patients' personally identifiable health
information and patients' protective behavior).
313. LISA M. BOYLE & DAVID M. MACK, HIPAA: A GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY LAW 1:4 (2004). See also BARUCH A. BRODY ET AL., MEDICAL ETHICS: ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES RAISED BY THE CODES OPINIONS AND STATEMENTS 178 (2001) (stating that a breach of

confidentiality damages the patient-physician relationship).
314. See Gostin, supra note 310, at 491 (noting that "[tihe consequence of incomplete
information is that patients may not receive adequate diagnosis and treatment of important health
conditions").

315. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
316. See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text (discussing patients' privacy protective
behavior).
317. See Gilbert, supra note 312, at 279 (discussing domino effect that may occur if contagious
diseases are not disclosed).
318. See infra notes 320-98 and accompanying text (discussing private and public benefit of
federal physician-patient privilege).
319. See infra notes 431-80 and accompanying text (discussing policy choices of various states
regarding physician-patient privilege and its relevance in federal judicial and legislative decision-
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experience" mandate the recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege.
1. A Federal Physician-Patient Privilege Would Serve Important Private
Interests
a. Absence of a FederalPhysician-PatientPrivilege Harms Individual
Patients'Health.
Patients have strong disincentives to be fully open and candid with their
physicians in the absence of a federal physician-patient privilege. 320 Obviously,
patients would not desire to have information that exposes diagnosis or
treatment for a sexually transmitted disease, a prior abortion, depression, or any
other condition that carries a social stigma publicly disclosed. Moreover,
patients have a direct disincentive to seek a constitutionally protected abortion
or treatment for a communicable sexually transmitted disease if there was even a
mere possibility that personally identifiable information regarding such
conditions, procedures, or treatments would find its way into the public domain.
One route to public disclosure is through the judicial process. The prospect that
sensitive health information could be disclosed in a trial record of a federal
proceeding is a legitimate concern for any patient. Patients have little or no
control over how and when their confidential communications made to a
physician will be exposed in federal litigation. 321 Thus, many patients may
choose to not discuss sensitive medical conditions with their physicians, or worse,
avoid treatment for such conditions, rather than risking the stigma,
embarrassment, or opprobrium to which they may be subjected' if the
information finds its way into the public domain. 322
Patients may 'also legitimately fear that objectively non-sensitive
information may provide inferences to sensitive medical conditions when
combined with other available information. Medical records, for example,
increasingly contain a vast amount of personal information with multiple uses. 323
Even when the information disclosed to a physician is not sensitive in an
objective sense, the disclosure and dissemination of this information could
provide a wealth of inferential information about other facets of the individual's
private life. This may include demographic information (a valuable tool for
consumer marketing), financial information (valuable to creditors and consumer
marketing of financial services), drug, alcohol, or tobacco use (valuable to
insurance providers or employers), or genetic information about the individual

making).
320. See supra notes 313-18 and accompanying text (discussing patients' fear of disclosure and its
effect on their behavior).
321. See infra notes 528-37 and accompanying text (discussing historical rule of evidence that did
not recognize physician-patient privilege).
322. See, e.g., ETzIONI, supra note 307, at 140-48 (noting that some patients choose not to seek
treatment or participate in studies to avoid disclosure).
323. See Gostin, supra note 310, at 490 (describing type of information that may be included in
medical records).
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In essence,
and their family (valuable to employers and insurance providers).
a detailed
create
to
used
be
may
records
medical
in
information contained
detriment.
individual's
the
to
used
be
could
that
profile of the individual
325
in the
Even with a strong recent federal policy on medical privacy,
that
threat
the
absence of a federal physician-patient privilege, there remains
this
After
court.
medical information could be disclosed by a physician in federal
medical
private
initial disclosure in open court, widespread dissemination of
information may be only a few mouse clicks away. Public court documents are
easily and instantaneously accessible via the Internet through many commercial
and non-commercial sources. 326 Recognition of a federal physician-patient
privilege would restrict disclosure of a patient's confidential medical information
in federal court proceedings and thus will promote patient-physician
communications necessary for effective diagnosis and treatment. Conversely,
the private interests of a patient in maintaining a trusting relationship with his or
her physician and in obtaining treatment are irreparably compromised in the
absence of a federal physician-patient privilege. Therefore, the absence of a
federal physician-patient privilege actually harms individual patients' health.

b. Absence of a FederalPhysician-PatientPrivilegeHarms Individual
Patients'Inherent ConstitutionalInterest in the Privacy of Their Medical
Information
Continued refusal to acknowledge a federal physician-patient privilege
compromises individuals' inherent and strong interest in protecting their
The United States Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional rights.
constitutionally protected right to privacy in the context of medical information
many years ago in Whalen v. Roe.327 One of the constitutionally protected
privacy interests that the Whalen Court identified was "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. ''328 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has observed, in applying Whalen, that "the right to confidentiality
includes the right to protection regarding information about the state of one's
health. ' 329 The Second Circuit further noted that "there are few matters that are
quite so personal as the status of one's health, and few matters the dissemination
330
However, the
of which one would prefer to maintain greater control over."

324. See ETZIONI, supra note 307, at 146-48 (discussing the value of medical information to
commercial interests).
325. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text (discussing HIPAA). See also infra notes 46075 and accompanying text (discussing recent federal genetic privacy initiatives).
326. See infra note 335 and accompanying text (discussing potential harm to patients resulting
from medical records that are used in judicial proceedings and accessible via Internet).
327. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
328. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. See also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977)
(reaffirming the notion of constitutional protection of informational privacy concluding that President
Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in "matters of [his] personal life").
329. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
330. Id. at 267.
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constitutional right to informational privacy is not absolute.33' A party seeking
disclosure of this protected information must surmount a heavy burden of
showing that a substantial interest outweighs this constitutionally protected
privacy interest. 332 While this recognized privacy interest is particularly strong in
the context of traditionally sensitive areas, such as abortion 333 and HIV/AIDS, 334
the sheer volume of information that could be gleaned inferentially3 35 through
judicial disclosure of a broad swath of medical information certainly implicates a
patient's constitutional right to privacy of his or her medical information.
Today's technology is increasingly putting the individual's constitutional
right to informational privacy at the mercy of technology.33 6 The absence of a
federal physician-patient privilege compounds this growing threat with no
concomitant benefit.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the paradox between
constitutionally protected privacy and rapidly advancing technology in the
Fourth Amendment context. 337 Lower courts have also relied on Fourth
Amendment standards in measuring the constitutional protection that should be
afforded to informational privacy. 338 The Fourth Amendment protects an

331. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-02 (noting disclosure of medical information to representatives
of State not an automatic infringement of privacy); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458, 465 (concluding that limited
intrusion into personal communications was justified).
332. Doe, 15 F.3d at 269.
333. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-C-55, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *18-19
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2004) (noting that issue of abortion is "indisputably of the most sensitive stripe" and
"one of the most controversial decisions in modern life"); see also Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C-03-4872,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) (noting
that even redacted medical records in context of abortion could not overcome strong right to
informational privacy).
334. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 267 (noting that a constitutionally protected privacy interest is
recognized in any serious medical condition "but is especially true with regard to those infected with
HIV").
335. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *6 (noting that medical
records can contain sensitive secondary information such as marital status, types of contraception,
sexual abuse or rape, or presence of sexually transmitted diseases). Furthermore, improperly redacted
medical records could expose demographic information, financial information, information about
disabilities, personal and social information (such as sexual orientation) as well as medical information
such as diagnoses, treatments, and medical histories. BOYLE & MACK, supra note 313, at 1:10-1:11.
336. See Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting how
Internet technology could be used to ascertain identities of patients from redacted medical records
made available during litigation). Judge Posner noted the possibility that "persons of [the patient's
acquaintance, or skillful 'Googlers,' [individuals who collect information from the Internet]" may sift
through information in patient's medical records that have been used in a judicial proceeding and
identify the patient. Id. This could consequently result in the patient's exposure to "threats,
humiliation, and obloquy" regarding the information contained therein. Id.
337. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (addressing whether use of thermalimaging technology to detect growth of marijuana indoors constitutes an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment).
338. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d
Cir. 1987) (concluding that an inquiry must be made into individual's expectation of confidentiality in
deciding whether information merits privacy protection).
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individual's right to privacy when the individual manifests a subjective
339
This
expectation of privacy that society accepts as objectively reasonable.
340
"Patients
standard is readily applicable in the medical information context.
have a right to have medical information held in confidence where they have a
reasonable expectation of such confidentiality within the physician-patient
relationship."' 341 Patients have developed a reasonable expectation that their
medical information will not be disclosed without their consent by their
342
physicians.
The United States Supreme Court's concern with the erosion of privacy in
the wake of technological advancements can be traced as far back as Olmstead v.
United States343 in 1928. Here, the Court ultimately upheld the government's use
344
of telephone wiretaps as not constituting an illegal search or seizure.
However, the often-quoted dissent of Justice Louis D. Brandeis expounded a
view that would later be recognized by the majority of the Court. 345 Justice
Brandeis, concerned. with the government's newfound ability through
wiretapping technology to "obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet, ' 346 noted that "[c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against
specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a
changing world. ''347 "Time works changes," 348 he added. As such, "our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be." 349 Any less
350
may result in "[r]ights declared in words [being] lost in reality."
The Supreme Court has sought to curb governmental encroachment on
privacy caused by technological advancements. In Kyllo v. United States, 351 the
Supreme Court recognized that rapid technological advancement may threaten
an individual's right to privacy in the home. 352 In an opinion written by Justice
Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the use of a technologically advanced
thermal imaging device to determine relative heat emanating from a home

concurring).
339. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
340. See BRODY ET AL., supra note 313, at 174-75 (discussing relationship between privacy of
medical information and Fourth Amendment).
341. Id. at 175.
342. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118-19 (Mass. 1985) (noting that patients rely on
fact that physician-patient privilege is confidential (citing MacDonald v. Clinger; 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982))).
343. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
344. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
345. See id. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) (arguing that constitutional clauses affording
individual protection must adapt to new circumstances).
346. Id. at 473.
347. Id. at 472.
348. Id. at 472 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,373 (1910)).
349. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349,373 (1910)).

350. Id.
351. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
352. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
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constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. 353 Justice Scalia
noted that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens ... has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology. '354
However, the power of technology to "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy" is
subject to limitations.355 Justice Scalia suggested that eroding an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of emerging technology would
leave the individual's privacy rights "at the mercy of advancing technology. '356
This is an unacceptable burden for the government to put on an individual's right
to privacy. Justice Scalia sought to curb the erosive effect that technology had
inflicted upon privacy. 357 He reasoned that it was the Court's duty to essentially
draw the line before technological advancements further eroded individuals'
3 58
expectations of privacy.
These limitations are equally applicable in the medical privacy context.
To
be sure, technological advancements in health care and information technology
are beneficial in many ways: improving the quality of medical treatment, making
medical record keeping more efficient, and reducing the costs of medical care.359
Nonetheless, these clearly beneficial capabilities of advancing technology must
be balanced against the increased endangerment of the individual patient's
constitutionally protected right to informational privacy. The Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence compels a reevaluation of the relative
constitutional interests at stake in the medical privacy context. On the balance, a
federal physician-patient privilege supports the constitutionally protected
privacy rights in medical information by mitigating technological encroachment
''36°
on the "realm of guaranteed privacy.
Technology has emerged as both a vehicle of unforeseen benefit to health
and unforeseen harm to privacy. Yet, technology itself should not be reigned in.
Rather, privacy protections in the face of emerging technology must be altered
to ensure that patients' rights to privacy in their medical information are not put
"at the mercy of advancing technology."'361 The "goal is to enhance privacy
protections in ways that do not impede [technological] evolution. '362 The
recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege serves the goal of privacy

353. Id. at 40.
354. Id. at 33-34.
355. 1& at 34.
356. Id. at 35.
357. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (noting the Court has rejected a mechanical interpretation of
Fourth Amendment, which would allow an invasion of privacy as long as the surveillance involved was
capturing information emanating from house).
358. See id, at 36 (concluding that privacy law must account for development of more
sophisticated technology).
359. See ETzIONI, supra note 307, at 150-54 (discussing beneficial aspects of computerized
medical records).
360. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (considering limits of technology's ability to infringe on privacy).
361. See id. at 35-36 (noting that privacy law must account for development of more sophisticated
technology).
.
362. Standards for Privacy 11, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,471..
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enhancement while allowing the benefits of advancing technology to flourish.
2. A Federal Physician-Patient Privilege Would Serve Important Public
Interests
a. Absence of a FederalPhysician-PatientPrivilegeHarms the Public Health
There is certainly no dispute that a healthy citizenry is of utmost importance
to any society. The federal physician-patient privilege could serve the "public
363
end" of decreasing privacy protective behavior that damages the public health.
Public health can be harmed by the absence of a federal physician-patient
privilege in three distinct ways. First, the physical health of the citizenry is
directly implicated in the absence of a federal physician-patient privilege. Since
many individuals engage in privacy protective behavior, there is the increased
364 If
possibility of sick, untreated individuals circulating among the public.
individual patients avoid medical treatment because they fear disclosure of
is
stigmatizing medical conditions, such as sexually transmitted diseases, there 365
obviously an increased potential for transmission of these conditions to others.
Having more sick individuals circulating among the population may have
detrimental economic effects as well. Sick individuals may be absent from work,
thereby reducing economic productivity. A new privilege will serve the public by
providing an incentive for sick individuals to seek necessary medical assistance.
Second, medical research suffers when individuals engage in privacy
protective behaviors. 366 Those eligible for testing or experimental treatment
may refuse to participate in research programs for fear that their medical
information will be publicly disclosed 367- even if that information is ostensibly
368
de-identified. Public health is inextricably linked to ongoing medical research.
Consumers of health care services generally have a distinct incentive in
facilitating medical research to improve the quality of the medical care that they
receive. 369 The absence of a federal physician-patient privilege militates against
this beneficial incentive. The sharing of medical data for research purposes
advances the treatment of common conditions. 370 Medical advancements
363. See supra Part B.5 for a discussion of the harmful effects of privacy protective behavior.

364. Id.
365. Because of the volume of information collected by health care providers, privacy protective
behavior may not be limited to stigmatizing conditions. As such, even common ailments, such as
influenza, may also remain untreated and free to spread throughout the population.
366. See ETZIONI, supra note 307, at 152-54 (explaining that access to medical records benefits
medical research and ultimately patient health care).
367. See id. at 146 (noting that women have refused to participate in medical research studies out
of fear that their genetic information would be disclosed).
368. See Paul Starr, Health and the Right to Privacy, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 194 (1999) (noting
that people have an interest in both medical research and public health measures).
369. See id. (noting that patients have an interest in medical research and other initiatives by
health care organizations to improve medical services).
370. See Gostin, supra note 310, at 481-82 (discussing benefits of increased medical data to
medical research and public health). We do not mean to suggest that a physician-patient privilege
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flourish with wider availability of objective medical data.3 71 A ready supply of
medical information enables researchers to improve medical services. 372 Thus, if
patients are unwilling to be anything but completely candid with their physicians,
not only is the health of the individual patient at risk, but the potential health
benefits to society in general are compromised.
The advancement of medical science requires individual patients to
cooperate with the collection and use of their de-identified medical information.
For example, if patients refuse to consent to tests that reveal genetic defects,
medical science will not be able to develop treatments as effectively. 373 Without
a physician-patient privilege, the public suffers from an increased incentive for
nondisclosure through unrealized benefits of medical research.
Finally, the availability of health information is necessary in recognizing and
responding to public health concerns. Availability of a wide variety of health
data "can help track the incidence, patterns, and trends of injury and disease in
populations." 374 This allows for a variety of essential public health activities,
such as identifying and preventing the spread of communicable diseases or
infections in certain areas375 and identifying risky behaviors in certain
populations. 376 Identification and tracking of these health risks allow society to
place its resources effectively in concentrated areas or populations. 377 If patients
refuse to disclose information or submit to medical tests out of fear of disclosure,
public health efforts will be hindered. Society will not be able to identify and
respond to troubling health trends, such as the increasing occurrence of sexually
transmitted diseases, precisely or cost-effectively.
The facilitation of general health that would flow from a federal physicianpatient privilege is a "public end" of paramount importance. The public interest
that a physician-patient privilege serves in the public health arena is arguably
exponentially more important than even a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The Jaffee Court was particularly concerned with the public benefit from police
officers who obtain effective counseling after traumatic events. 378 While that
"public end" is indisputably important, the public end that the physician-patient
privilege would serve is even more compelling. At stake is not only the
individual health of patients, but the health of all of society. If Jaffee is to be a
model for the creation of new evidentiary privileges, the public interests that are
served by a new evidentiary privilege must look at the gravity of the "public
would impair the confidentiality safeguards in place under other laws protecting patient identity and
medical research.
371. Id.
372. See id. at 482 (noting that health information infrastructure could benefit health services).
373. See ETzIONI, supra note 307, at 146 (arguing that fear of disclosure can hinder medical
research and endanger medical treatment).
374. Gostin, supranote 310, at 482-83.
375. Id at 483.
376. See id. (giving example of "smoking among female adolescents or ethnic minorities").
377. Id.
378. See Jaffee; 518 U.S. at 11 n.10 (stating that police officers, subjected to physical and
emotional danger, require confidential counseling to continue effectively safeguarding community).
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end" implicated there as a litmus test for future privileges. Clearly, the "public
ends" implicated by the physician-patient privilege dwarf those involved in
Jaffee.
b. The Physician-PatientPrivilege Could Mitigate the Societal Costs of
Medical Malpractice.
The costs of medical malpractice litigation have placed a substantial
financial burden on providers and consumers of health services and citizens in
general. 379 The average payment for a malpractice claim has risen steadily over
the past twenty years from $95,000 in 1986 to $320,000 in 2002, a growth rate
more than twice the amount of general inflation. 380 Every year, there are
approximately 15 malpractice claims for every 100 physicians. 381 The costs
associated with medical malpractice may provide an incentive for physicians to
practice "defensive medicine"- a practice that occurs when physicians "perform
tests and provide treatments that they would not otherwise perform merely to
protect themselves against the risk of possible litigation."' 382 This practice may
383
result in substantial increases in health care costs that the public must bear.
Some insurance companies refuse to underwrite medical malpractice insurance,
384
making insurance coverage less available and more expensive for physicians.
Malpractice insurance premiums and litigations costs can become so financially
385
burdensome that capable physicians may be forced out of the profession.
Some physicians opt to practice without malpractice insurance altogether. 386 In
addition, some physicians are relocating from urban settings to rural locations or
379. See Michelle M. Mello, Malpractice Liability and Medical Error Prevention: Strange

Bedfellows?, Paper prepared for the Council on Health Economics and Policy, Conference on Medical
Malpractice in Crisis: Health Policy Options 8 (March 2003) (noting that physicians are leaving or

limiting their scope of practice due to the high cost of liability insurance resulting from medical
malpractice lawsuits), available at http://www.allhealth.org/recent/audio_09-29-03/malpracticeAnd
Errors-Mello.pdf.
380. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 3-4 (Jan. 8, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968101-08MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
381. Id.
382. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 4 (July 24, 2002), availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf.
383. See id. at 7 (noting that cost of malpractice increases amount the federal government and
taxpayers must pay by $28.6-47.5 billion per year).

384. Mello, supra note 379, at 8.
385. See, e.g., Nightline: A Dying Practice: What Happens When Doctors Go Out of Business

(ABC television broadcast, July 25, 2002) (reporting that some doctors cannot continue to practice
medicine due to increased insurance premiums), available at LEXIS, News library, ABC News File.
See also Gayle Worland, Doctors Flee Insurance Costs, State, CHI. TRB., Mar. 12, 2004, at C1
(reporting that many doctors, particularly obstetricians, have been forced to move their practices to
states with lower insurance costs).
386. See Bruce Japsen, Doctors Risk PracticingWithout Costly Insurance, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18,
2004, at C1 (stating that some physicians are opting to practice without insurance coverage rather than
pay high premiums).
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physician-friendly states, causing a doctor shortage in a number of states and
major metropolitan areas. 387 Medical malpractice suits also burden scarce
judicial resources, thus affecting all citizens' efficient access to the courts.
A federal physician-patient privilege could mitigate the societal costs of
medical malpractice in two ways. First, the increased incentive for candor
between patients and physicians that a physician-patient privilege promotes
would facilitate thorough and efficient diagnosis and treatment. If a patient fully
discloses information to his or her physician without reservation, the physician
has a better chance of accurately diagnosing the patient and assigning an
appropriate course of treatment.
Conversely, the absence of a federal physician-patient privilege may support
the continued proliferation of medical malpractice suits. In the analogous
situation of attorney-client communications, such a privilege serves public ends
by "encourag[ing] full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice." 388 One of these "broader public interests" that
the attorney-client privilege serves is the furtherance of competent legal
services. 389 "The [attorney-client] privilege rests on the belief that.., full
disclosure to an attorney is a necessary predicate to skillful advocacy and fully
informed legal advice." 390 One policy justification that underlies the attorneyclient privilege is that without a protective privilege, a client will not fully
disclose relevant information to his or her attorney, which in turn will result in
' 391
legal advice that is "predicated on half-truths."
The benefits of facilitating the attorney's advice with all available client
information is not only that the individual client benefits from optimal
representation,. but society benefits by avoiding the inevitable costs of
incompetent professional services. 392 - In the attorney-client dynamic, this
manifests itself in reduced complaints about attorneys to professional
disciplinary bodies and reduced malpractice suits against attorneys. Access to
competent legal services is increased because fewer attorneys will be disciplined,
disbarred or be forced from practice, thereby assuring greater access to legal
387. See Worland, supra note 385, at C1 (discussing physicians' movement from Chicago to
nearby states, such as Wisconsin and Indiana, that cap non-economic damages). See also The Doctors
are Leaving, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 2004, at C8 (reporting that the American Medical Association
recognized Illinois as one of nineteen states suffering from a "full blown" malpractice crisis and noting

that "[tihere is not a single neurosurgeon to treat head trauma cases now in Will, Grundy and
Kankakee counties... [and] [hligh risk obstetrics care is difficult to find Downstate").
388. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981)).
389. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (recognizing that attorney-client privilege exists so that
attorneys may be fully informed and capable of providing competent legal advice).
390. In re Dow Corning Corp., 261 F.3d 280 284 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)).
391. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT

DOCTRINE 3 (4th ed. 2001) (asserting that attomey-client privilege is necessary so that clients do not
withhold information based on fear of future disclosure).
392. See id. at 5 (noting that attorneys can address legal matters effectively only if clients disclose
what they know).
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services. In addition, the amount of judicial resources that are needed to
respond to attorney malpractice suits is reduced, providing financial benefit to
society as well.
This justification for the attorney-client privilege can certainly be applied to
the physician-patient privilege. As with the attorney-client privilege, the
physician-patient privilege would facilitate effective medical care and prevent
medical advice "predicated on half-truths" by encouraging full and true
disclosure by the patient. More effective medical care would not only benefit the
individual patient, but it would also confer enormous benefits on society through
the abatement of the high costs to society of medical malpractice.
Second, the atmosphere of trust facilitated by a federal physician-patient
privilege may reduce the likelihood that an injured patient will seek redress
through a lawsuit. Many medical malpractice suits could be avoided if the
physician-patient relationship was based on total trust and open
communication. 393 Studies have found that the relationship between the
physician and patient plays a large role in whether a patient will make a
malpractice claim against his or her physician. 394
"Breakdowns in
communication between physician and patient fuel distrust and pent up
anger." 395 This may result in a greater propensity for a lawsuit to be filed if there
is a "bad outcome" in diagnosis or treatment. Assuming that a patient has been
injured in a medical procedure, a stronger physician-patient relationship may
reduce the likelihood that the patient will file a malpractice suit.
It should be noted that the physician-patient privilege in many states is
subject to an exception to disclosure, which allows physicians to defend
themselves against malpractice claims filed in state courts. 396 Clearly, this is a
reasonable and necessary exception to privileged communications between
patients and physicians. However, this exception is only implicated after
malpractice has already occurred (or at least been implicated in a lawsuit). 397 At
that point, an individual has already been injured and costly discovery has
already been triggered. Thus, many of the benefits of reducing malpractice
litigation are not implicated by permitting this exception, since the value of an
393. See THOMAS J. BALCEZAK ET AL., YALE-NEW HAVEN MEDICAL CENTER, ISSUES IN RISK

MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING MALPRACTICE, (Feb. 1998) (suggesting ways for physicians to decrease
risk of malpractice lawsuits), at http://info.med.yale.edu/caim/risk/av malprac/av-malprac_2.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004).
394. See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-PatientCommunication: The Relationship with
Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 553 (1997)
(referring to a study which found that patient dissatisfaction is a main factor in the initiation of medical
malpractice suits).

395. DAN GROSZKRUGER, COOPERATIVE OF AM. PHYSICIANS, PHYSICIAN-PATIENT DIALOGUE:
KEY TO AVOIDING MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS, (1999), at http://www.cap-mpt.com/riskmanagement/
physicianpatient. html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
396. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-802(2) (West 2002) (recognizing an exception to a
general

physician-patient

privilege

"in

actions, civil

or criminal,

against

the physician

for

malpractice").
397. See Petrillo v. Syntax Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 967 (1986) (finding that patient implicitly
waives privilege upon filing suit against treating physician).
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evidentiary privilege that fosters openness between patient and physician
reduces the chance that the physician will harm the patient initially.
Notwithstanding this exception, society stands to benefit from the prospect of
reduced malpractice litigation through a federal physician-patient privilege.
The benefits that society could reap by reducing medical malpractice suits
are substantial. Even a slight reduction of malpractice suits against physicians
would, in the language of the Jaffee Court, "serve public ends" of the highest
importance. 398 Health care costs could be reduced. Fewer physicians would be
forced from the medical profession due to the cost of malpractice insurance.
Public access to quality health care could be increased. Burdens on the judicial
system could be minimized by reduced malpractice litigation. All of these
crippling costs of malpractice claims could be mitigated by recognition of a
federal physician-patient privilege.
3. Loss of Evidence Due to the Federal Physician-Patient Privilege Would
Be Modest
Any potential evidentiary loss from recognizing a federal physician-patient
privilege would be less significant than that which existed in Jaffee. First, as the
Court explained in Jaffee, patients who believe that information will be used to
their detriment will simply refuse to disclose this information. 399 In Jaffe, this
meant that individuals would simply refuse to engage in "confidential
conversations" with their psychotherapists. 4° ° In the context of the physicianpatient relationship, conversations between patients and their physicians could
be similarly "chilled. '40 1 Moreover, a patient may refuse to undergo certain
diagnostic tests that could reveal potentially damaging information. This refusal
would be the equivalent of the "unspoken evidence" that the Jaffee Court
described as serving "no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been
spoken and privileged."'' 4 In short, any evidentiary value that could be gleaned
from medical tests could never be realized if the patient refuses to give consent
to undergo the test in the first place.
Second, as with state physician-patient privileges, a federal physicianpatient privilege would presumably be subject to many exceptions to
nondisclosure. Illinois, for example, provides eleven statutory exceptions to
nondisclosure by a physician, including one for malpractice actions against a
health care provider, actions where a patient's physical or mental condition is at
issue, and in homicide trials when the disclosure relates to the circumstances of
the homicide. 40 3 Additionally, there are a variety of ways under the several state
laws in which a patient may explicitly or implicitly waive the protection of the

398. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
399. See id. at 11-12 (asserting that patients' conversations with psychotherapists would be chilled
without benefit of privilege).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 12.
403. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 5/8-802 (West 2002).
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privilege. 4°4 Thus, relevant information learned within the scope of the
physician-patient relationship may still be used for the purposes of litigation
under a wide variety of circumstances. It would likely be no less with a federal
physician-patient privilege. A federal physician-patient privilege that carefully
circumscribes some exceptions would have a modest effect on the evidentiary
use of relevant patient disclosures. Thus, per Jaffee, "the likely evidentiary
40 5
benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege is modest.
Third, there remains the risk that, if physicians are compelled to reveal
confidential patient communications in the absence of a privilege, physicians
may, in accordance with their ethical duties of confidentiality, resist disclosure by
concealing or modifying the content of the communications. 40 6 Under these
circumstances, the evidentiary value of this evidence is inherently suspect. As
the New York state legislature explained when recognizing the state physicianpatient privilege:
[D]uring the struggle between legal duty on the one hand, and
professional honor on the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense of
the injustice and inhumanity of the rule, will, in most cases, furnish a
temptation [by the physician] to the perversion or concealment of
40 7
truth, too strong for human resistance.
Finally, recognition of a physician-patient privilege may, in fact, lead to
more evidence being presented in any given case. Physicians, faced with the
prospect of being compelled to betray the confidences of their patients in federal
court, may resist providing expert testimony in court at all. For example, if a
physician foresees the prospect that his or her patients' confidential information
may be used to impeach the professional opinion of an expert witness, the
physician may refuse to participate in judicial proceedings. Consequently, the
evidentiary benefit that would be realized through expert testimony would be
lost. Providing the protections of a federal physician-patient privilege would
encourage physicians to contribute to the evidentiary development in litigation,
while safeguarding the physician's ethics of nondisclosure.
In sum, the evidentiary loss in recognizing the physician-patient privilege is
modest. Applying Jaffee's balancing test for recognizing a new privilege, it is
clear that the physician-patient privilege satisfies the "reason and experience"
requirement of FRE 501. Recognition of a physician-patient privilege would
serve private and public ends of paramount importance. The physician-patient
404. See 2 SCOTT N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, §7 at 29-32 (2d
ed. McGraw-Hill 1995). A patient may waive the physician-patient privilege "merely by saying so, as
long as this statement satisfies any general or specific state laws on waiver of rights." Id. at 30. A
patient may also waive the privilege impliedly through conduct. If, for example, a patient testifies as
to privileged communications with his or her physician, the opposing party may ask the physician
about the same communications. Id. at 31.
405. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
406. See SIMSON

GARFINKEL, DATABASE

NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY

IN THE 21ST

CENTURY 139-40 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000) (explaining that some doctors choose to alter patients'
records due to concern that some conditions may lead to increased insurance premiums for patients).
407. N.Y. REV. STAT. 737 (1836).
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privilege serves private interests of "transcendent importance" 40 8 in promoting
the individual health of a patient seeking medical advice from a physician. The
physician-patient privilege serves public interests of paramount importance by
facilitating societal access to useful medical information, potentially improving
medical science, and by reducing the crippling costs of medical malpractice
lawsuits. As such, it is abundantly clear that recognition of a physician-patient
privilege is not only proper; it is imperative.
4. HIPAA Provides Strong andUnambiguous Federal Policy that Supports
Recognition of a Federal Physician-Patient Privilege Under Jaffee and
Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
Since Jaffee was decided in 1996, there has been a drastic recognition of the
incipient need for strong federal protection of medical privacy. Congress
responded to the changing technological environment of the health care industry
by passing HIPAA, 40 9 creating a federal floor for the protection of health
information privacy and establishing a strong and unambiguous federal policy
410
for protection of the communications between patients and their physicians.
The value of an unambiguous federal policy consistent with the protections of a
physician-patient privilege cannot be overstated - HIPAA and its underlying
policy provide ample "reason and experience" to sustain a federal physicianpatient privilege under the test articulated in Jaffee.
HIPAA provides two separate means of federal "reason and experience"
on which to form a foundation for a federal physician-patient privilege. HIPAA
itself represents a strong federal policy of protecting medical privacy that
parallels the policy that would underlie a federal physician-patient privilege.
HIPAA also provides a means by which state privilege laws are given effect as
federal law, thus providing further support for a federal physician-patient
privilege.
a. HIPAA Represents a Strong FederalPolicy of Confidentiality of Health
Information
Even though the HIPAA Privacy Rule was promulgated by HHS, Congress
intended to link the privacy protections of the Privacy Rule to congressional
action. 411 For this reason, the HIPAA Privacy Rule can be read as direct
congressional action to strengthen the protection of medical information.
However, the privacy protections that HIPAA affords are only a "framework of
protection that can be strengthened by both the federal government and by
states as health information systems continue to evolve." 412 Thus, HIPAA
408. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (emphasizing importance of citizens' mental health).
409. See generally HIPAA, 110 Stat. 1936 (protecting privacy of patient health information).
410. Id.
411. See Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,469 (noting that "[i]n conference, the
requirement for privacy standards was moved to a separate section in the same part of HIPAA,
section 264, so that Congress could link the Privacy standards to Congressional action").

412. Id. at 82,464.
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specifically contemplated strengthening of its medical privacy protections to
ensure that its mandate is fulfilled. 413 A federal physician-patient privilege
would provide such strengthening.
HIPAA recognizes that confidentiality of medical information is "vital" to
the physician-patient relationship. 4 4 The rationale behind HIPAA's Privacy
Rule virtually mirrors the rationale for justifying a federal physician-patient
privilege. 415 HHS noted that "[medical privacy] is necessary for the effective
delivery of health care, both to individuals and populations. '4 6 HHS also
explicitly recognized that "[i]ndividuals cannot be expected to share the most
intimate details of their lives unless they have confidence that such information
will not be used or shared inappropriately. '417 HHS specifically contemplated
that patients engage in privacy protective behavior, such as withholding
and avoiding
information from physicians, providing inaccurate information,
41 8
care altogether in the absence of adequate privacy protections.
The Privacy Rule also acknowledges that patients' privacy protective
behavior harms society in general by restricting the ability of the medical
community to use the aggregate of individuals' medical information for medical
research to "identify troubling public health trends" and to "evaluat[e] the
effectiveness of various public health efforts. ' 41 9 Consequently, HIPAA
recognizes that the confidentiality of medical information "serves public ends" of
paramount importance.
Beyond HIPAA's parallel rationale with a recognition of a federal
physician-patient privilege, the HIPAA Privacy Rule challenges Jaffee's implicit
rejection of the physician-patient privilege. The Jaffee Court implied that a
physician-patient privilege was not as compelling as a psychotherapist-patient
privilege because "[t]reatment by a physician for physical ailments can often
proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective
420
information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests.
HIPAA rejects this presumption. Instead, the Privacy Rule states that "[i]n
order to receive accurate and reliable diagnosis and treatment, patients must
provide [physicians] with accurate and detailed information about their personal
health, behavior, and other aspects of their lives.421 Jaffee's implicit rejection of
the need for a physician-patient privilege stands at odds with the congressional
mandate of HIPAA.
413. See id. (asserting that goal of HIPAA was to ensure privacy and patient access to
information on federal level).
414. See id. at 82,463 (explaining that assurance of confidential communications between patient
and physician ensures that high-quality healthcare will be provided).
415. See supra notes 46-78 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind recognition of
a federal physician-patient privilege).
416. Standards for Privacy 11, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,467.
417. Id. at 82,467-68.
418. Id at 82,468.
419. Id. at 82,467.
420. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
421. Standards for Privacy II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,467.
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In sum, HIPAA must be read as 15roviding federal policy that parallels the
justification for a physician-patient privilege and rejecting Jaffee's implicit
dismissal of the necessity of a federal physician-patient privilege.
This
unambiguous support is immeasurably valuable in supplying the foundation of
"reason and experience" necessary to sustain a federal physician-patient
privilege under FRE 501. It should be noted that the Jaffee Court recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege without the benefit of nearly as much direct
federal policy supporting the protection of the privacy right at issue. 422
b. HIPAA's PreemptionProvisionAllows State Privilege Laws to be Applied
as De Facto FederalPrivacy Laws
The significance of widespread recognition of a physician-patient privilege
by the individual states also takes on new significance in the context of HIPAA.
HIPAA contains a preemption provision that provides that the Act and its
attendant regulations "supersede any contrary provision of State law. '423
However, HIPAA's provisions do not preempt state law if the state law is "more
stringent" than HIPAA's requirements. 424 A state law is "contrary" to HIPAA
when "a covered entity would find it impossible to comply with both the State
and federal requirements."' 425 A' state privacy law is "more stringent" than
HIPAA if it "prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure in circumstances under
which such use or disclosure otherwise would be permitted" 426 under HIPAA.
According to section 264(c)(2) of HIPAA, this applies to all "judicial
proceedings," federal and state alike. 427 Thus, state privilege law will apply when
it provides more stringent protections of medical privacy than federal law, even
428
in the context of a federal question case.
Essentially, HIPAA has enacted a privacy protective scheme whereby
"more stringent" state laws are an integral part of the federal government's
medical privacy policy. As the Northern District of Illinois recently stated:
"because [state] privacy protections are activated only through HIPAA's antipreemption provision, this is not a case of [state] law trumping federal law but
instead a case of one federal law displacing another."429 State privacy laws,
including those state laws that establish a physician-patient privilege, should be
read as providing the "requisite reason" and experience under Jaffee, despite the
fact that they were initially enacted as state laws. In essence, HIPAA's scheme

422. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13-14 (noting States' unanimous acceptance of the psychotherapist
privilege).
423. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).
424. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2002).
425. Id. § 160.202(1).
426. Id
427. Id.
428. See United States ex rel. Stewart v. Louisiana Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS
24062, at *16 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2002) (recognizing that Louisiana privilege law would not apply to a
federal qui tam action because it was not "more stringent" under HIPAA).
429. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1701, at *16.
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intended for certain state privacy laws to be de facto federal laws in the area of
federal medical privacy policy. HIPAA has essentially co-opted strict state
privilege laws as an integral part of the federal medical privacy scheme.
5. Consensus of State Legislatures for Physician-Patient Privilege Provides
Strong Policy for Federal Recognition of a Physician-Patient Privilege
Under Jaffee and Federal Rule of Evidence 501
The Jaffee Court recognized that "the policy decisions of the States bear on
' 430
The
the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege.
Court put strong emphasis on the existence of a "consensus" among state
recognition of a privilege. 431 This "consensus" indicated that both "'reason and
432
When Jaffee was decided,
experience"' supported recognition of the privilege.
fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 433 Clearly, "[tihe emphasis that the Supreme Court put on the
universal state recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is strong
strong weight on issues of national
evidence that at least that Court places 434
conformity on the existence of a privilege.
The rationale behind this assertion was two-fold. First, since state
legislatures are presumably aware of the need to protect the integrity of the factfinding functions of their courts, wide-spread acceptance of a privilege by the
states can provide both "reason and experience" for recognition of a new federal
privilege. 435 This rationale takes on additional significance when read in the
context of the Jaffee Court's pronouncement that legislative action rather than
4 36
judicial action will likely be the source of new developments in privilege law.
Second, denying a federal privilege in the face of widespread state recognition of
437
This was of
a privilege "would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation."
"any
because
communications
confidential
of
context
in
the
particular concern
privilege
...
the
if
value
little
have
would
confidentiality
of
promise
State's
would not be honored in federal court. ' 438 In other words, patients who feared
disclosure of confidential information would continue to withhold information in
the absence of a commensurate federal privilege even with the support of a state
privilege. Consequently, the state privilege would be abrogated by the absence
of a parallel federal privilege.
This rationale is equally persuasive to a physician-patient privilege. At

430. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13.
431. Id. at 13.
432. Id.

433. Id. at 12 n.11.
434. Broun, supra note 305, at 805-06.
435. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 (noting that consensus among state courts supports conclusion that
there was reason and experience to support federal recognition of privilege).
436. See id. (stating that common-law was no longer primary source of new developments in
federal privilege law).
437. Id.
438. Id.
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present, forty states and the District of Columbia recognize a physician-patient
privilege. 439 As such, if, as Jaffee properly indicated, federal recognition of new
privileges is to be a reflection of a general state of the law in the nation, the
argument for a federal physician-patient privilege is strong.440 There exists a
situation akin to that in Jaffee where state legislatures have "rapidly recognized
the wisdom of the rule' a 1 as the nature of the physician-patient relationship has
evolved. It would be prudent for the federal judiciary to recognize the wisdom
of this rule as well.
Most of the state physician-patient privilege rules mirror the rationale set
forth by New York in 1828 for recognizing a physician-patient privilege. 442 It
was asserted that the physician-patient privilege was necessary 'to protect the
health of the patient and provide effective medical care. 443 If communications
439. The following states have adopted a physician-patient privilege: Alaska, ALASKA R. EVID.
504; Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (West 2003); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41101, R. 503 (Michie 1999); California, CAL. Ev1D. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West 1995); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(d) (2003); Delaware, DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 503; District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-307 (2001); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (1995); Hawaii, RAW. R. EViD. 504;
Idaho. IDAHO CODE § 9-203.4 (Michie 2004); Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-802 (2004);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (West 2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1999);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (Supp. 2004); Louisiana, LA. CODE EVID. ART. 510 (West 2004);
Maine, ME. R. EvID. 503; Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 2000); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(d) (West 2000); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1999);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(5) (West 1996); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (2000);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1995); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.215-.245 (Michie
2002); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (1995); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (McKinney 1992); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2003); North Dakota, N.D. R. EvID. 503; Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02(B) (Anderson 2001); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (1993); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40.235 (Butterworth 1988); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5929 (West
1982); Rhode Island, R.I. CODE R. § 5-37.3-4 (2002); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-6
to -11 (Michie 1987); Texas, TEx. R. EVID. 509 (West 2004); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(4)
(2002); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612(a) (2002); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399
(Michie 2000); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (West 1995); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 2000); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (Michie 2003).
440. See Broun, supra note 305, at 807 (noting that federal rules are, to some extent,
representative of general state of State law).
441. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14.
442. Robert A. Wade, Note, The Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege: Modified, Revised, and
Defined, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1147, 1148 (1989) (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 406, § 73 (1828)).
443. Id (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 737 (1836)). The revisers of the statute stated:
The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged, is the supposed necessity of
a full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to prepare for the proper defense or
prosecution of a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself
may be in jeopardy, is still stronger. And unless such consultations are privileged, men will
be incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries without
relief from the medical art, and without conviction of any offence. Besides, in such cases,
during the struggle between legal duty on the'one hand, and professional honor on the other,
the latter, aided by a strong sense of the injustice and inhumanity of the rule, will, in most
cases, furnish a temptation to the perversion or concealment of truth, too strong for human
resistance.
Id. (quoting N.Y. REV. STAT. 737 (1836))
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between patient and physician were not privileged, patients would often refuse
to seek medical treatment. 444 Further, if physicians were compelled to reveal
confidential patient communications, physicians might, in accordance with their
ethical duties of confidentiality, resist disclosure by concealing or modifying the
content of those communications. 445 This reasoning is equally compelling for a
of
federal privilege. Many of the state privilege laws also mirror the recognition
4 46
a physician-patient privilege set forth in Uniform Rule of Evidence 503.
While the scope of a physician-patient privilege may differ from state to
state, 44 7 Jaffee recognized that the force of states' decisions to enact a new
privilege outweighs any limited variations in the scope that the privilege protects

444. Id.
445. See infra notes 509-17 and accompanying text (discussing the medical profession's ethical
rules regarding confidentiality).
446. Rule 503 provides as follows:
Rule 503-Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege (a) Definitions. As used in this
rule: (1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a [physician
or] psychotherapist. [(2) A "physician" is a person authorized to practice medicine in any
state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be.] (3) A "psychotherapist" is (i)
a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by
the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, or, (ii) a person licensed or certified as a
psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged. (4) A
communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except
persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or
interview, persons reasonably believed necessary for the transmission of the communication,
or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the
[physician or] psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. (b) General Rule
of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment
of his [physical,] mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among
himself, [physician or] psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the [physician or] psychotherapist, including members of
the patient's family. (c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, his guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased patient.
The person who was the [physician or] psychotherapist at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. (d)
Exceptions. (1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental
illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the
patient is in need of hospitalization. (2) Examination by order of court. If the court orders an
examination of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party
or a witness, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule
with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the court
orders otherwise. (3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under
this rule as to a communication relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
UNIF. R. EvtD. 503.
447. See supra note 439 (listing the various physician-patient privilege statutes). See also BOYLE
& MACK, supra note 313, at 2:5.
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from state to state." 8 As such, the strength of the overwhelming recognition of
the physician-patient privilege is undiminished by the variations of the privilege
between the states.
The failure of federal courts to explicitly recognize a federal physicianpatient privilege undermines the promise of confidentiality that the
overwhelming majority of the states have made to their citizens. As recognized
in Jaffee, this creates the threat of an impermissible abrogation of state law. 44 9
The destruction that incomplete protection in the area of privacy can inflict upon
individuals' privacy rights has been noted in other contexts 450 and specifically by
the Jaffee Court.451 Other compelling reasons also exist for consistency of state
and federal law in this area, such as preventing forum shopping by litigants.
Clearly, federal recognition of the. physician-patient. privilege is strongly
supported by a consensus among the states on a physician-patient privilege.
6. Consistent Federal Medical Privacy Policy in the Context of Genetic
Nondiscrimination Provides "Reason and Experience"
Federal actions taken the since the 1996 Jaffee decision have illustrated an
evolutionary policy to protect medical privacy in response to technological
advancement. As discussed below, the need for even greater protection of
medical information than HIPAA provides has been recognized by the Clinton
Administration and Congress. Thus, federal governmental policy favors the
development of medical privacy protections through recognition of a federal
physician-patient privilege.
President Clinton signed Executive Order 13145 on February 8, 2000.452 In
doing so, he recognized the threat that technology, specifically the decoding of
the human genome, posed to the privacy of individuals' medical information. 453
Executive Order 13145 prohibits federal government agencies from obtaining
genetic information from employees or job applicants and from using genetic
information in hiring and promotion decisions. 454 President Clinton, citing
Justice Brandeis, noted that "technological advances would require us to be
ever-vigilant in protecting what [Brandeis] said was civilization's most valued
right, the fundamental right to privacy. '455 President Clinton noted that
"powerful ways of technological change threaten to erode our sacred walls of
448. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14 n.13.
449. Id. at 13-14.
450. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (noting that "[t]he ignoble shortcut.., left open
to the State [by inapplicability of the exclusionary rule] tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest").
451. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
452. Exec. Order No. 13145,3 C.F.R § 235 (2001).
453. See also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing genetic privacy).
454. NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., FED. GOV'T POL'Y ON GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION IN INS. AND EMP., at http://www.genome.gov/11510229 (last visited Oct. 20,2004).
455. NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMENTS ON THE

SIGNING OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13145 (Feb. 8, 2000), at http://www.genome.gov/10002346 (last visited
Nov. 12,2004).
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privacy in ways we could not have envisioned a generation ago. ' 456 President
Clinton announced that the government now had new responsibilities to ensure
that technology did not "pry open the protective doors of privacy." 457 To ensure
this was done, President Clinton asserted, the government needed to go further
than HIPAA to protect medical information. 458 Thus, President Clinton gave a
mandate to further develop privacy protections in the face of technological
threats to medical information.
The 108th Congress has continued to develop and expand privacy policy as
well, introducing dozens of medical privacy related bills. 459 For example, on
October 14, 2003, the United States, Senate passed the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2003460 by a vote of 95-0.461 This bill would prohibit
health insurance plans from denying enrollment or basing insurance premiums
on the basis of genetic information, prohibits disclosures or collection of genetic
information for underwriting purposes, and prohibits the use of genetic
information in employment decisions. 462 This bill would follow the HIPAA
model by setting another federal floor for medical privacy by providing basic
protections of medical information while deferring to more stringent state and
463
federal measures.
Despite the Bush Administration's weakening of privacy protections under

456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See id. (noting that "the health insurance portability law ...was an important first step, but
we must go further").
459. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WEB SITE, at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited May 9, 2004) (providing searchable database of Congressional bills).
See, e.g., Stop Taking Our Health Privacy Act of 2003, H.R. 1709, 108th Cong. (2003) (restoring
"standards to protect the privacy of individually identifiable health information"); Medical
Independence, Privacy, and Innovation Act of 2003, H.R. 2544, 108th Cong. (2003) (intending "to
improve the quality, availability, diversity, personal privacy, and innovation of health care in the
Unites States"); Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2004, H.R. 663, 108th Cong. (2003)
(attempting "to provide for the improvement of patient safety and to reduce the incidence of events
that adversely affect patient safety"); Defense of Privacy Act, H.R. 338, 108th Cong. (2003) (requiring
that "agencies, in promulgating rules, take into consideration the impact of such rules on the privacy of
individuals"); Patient Privacy Act, H.R. 1699, 108th Cong. (2003) (repealing sections 1173(b) and
1177(a)(1) of the Social Security Act); Equal Rights and Equal Dignity for Americans Act of 2003, S.
16., 108th Cong. (2003) (authorizing Attorney General, upon request, to provide assistance with
investigation or prosecution of violent and hate based crimes); Health Information for Quality
Improvement Act, S.2003, 108th Cong. (2003) (intending to "promote higher quality health care and
better health by strengthening health information, its infrastructure, and its use by clinicians and
consumers"); Better HEALTH Act of 2003, S.1374, 108th Cong. (2003) (enhancing patient access to
care through direct assistance); Health Care Coverage Expansion and Quality Improvement Act of
2003, S. 10, 108th Cong. (2003) (attempting to improve managed care by increasing access to
information and care).
460. S.1053, 108th Cong. (2003).
461. NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 454.
462. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, MEDICAL PRIVACY: GENETIC INFORMATION
(detailing impact of Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003), at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/medical/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).

463. Id.
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the modified HIPAA Privacy Rule, 464 there has nevertheless been recognition by
the current administration that privacy protections must continue to be
developed. In 2001, President Bush "called on Congress to enact reasonable
legislation to prohibit genetic discrimination in employment and health
insurance. '465 A White House press release noted that there is "growing
concern that employers and insurance companies will use genetic information to
discriminate by denying jobs or insurance coverage to individuals who have
predictive genetic markers for certain diseases. ''466 Moreover, the White House
acknowledged that "[t]here is also a concern that current laws have not kept
pace with the issues raised by the scientific and technological progress of
genetics. ' 467 While the Bush Administration's policies have thus far failed to
further develop necessary medical privacy protections, they have nonetheless
supported the notion that privacy protections must be periodically altered to
respond to technological change.
Current federal government policy promotes the evolution of protections of
medical privacy. A federal physician-patient privilege would complement this
policy. Consequently, the evolutionary mandate of Federal Rule of Evidence
501 and Jaffee should be applied with this developing governmental policy as
strong support for the evolutionary protection of medical privacy.
7. Consistent State Genetic Nondiscrimination Legislation Provides
Additional "Reason and Experience"
In establishing a new privilege, the Jaffee Court observed "the policy
decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal courts should
recognize a new privilege. '468 Jaffee further noted that "it is appropriate to treat
a consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both
'reason' and 'experience.' 469 In the present case, there is a consistent trend of
increased medical privacy protection in the arena of genetic discrimination.
State genetic discrimination laws provide extensive "experience" on which to
base the federal physician-patient privilege.
At present, forty-one states have enacted legislation on genetic
discrimination in health insurance and thirty-one states have enacted legislation
on genetic discrimination in the workplace. 470 Nearly all of these laws have been
464. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing 2002 modifications to HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
465. White House News Release, Today's Presidential Action (June 2001) (summarizing
President's call for legislative action to prevent genetic discrimination), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2001/06/20010623-2.html (last visited Dec. 28,2004).
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13.
469. Id. at 13.
470. See NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., POLICY AND LEGIS. DATABASE (providing

searchable database of federal and state laws pertaining to "privacy of genetic
information/confidentiality; informed consent; insurance and employment discrimination; genetic
testing and counseling; and commercialization and patenting"), at http://www.genome.gov/
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passed since Jaffee was decided and HIPAA was passed. 47 1 They were enacted
in response to concerns about technology's erosion of privacy, specifically the
privacy of genetic information, and their underlying policies parallel the
472
rationale supporting recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege.
These laws provide a wide variety of increased protections of medical
information, 473 including prohibitions on the release of the results of a genetic
test without consent, 474 provisions that define genetic information as confidential
and privileged, 475 prohibitions on disclosing genetic information (even in
response to a subpoena) backed up by penalties, 476 provisions that make genetic
testing and information inadmissible as evidence and not discoverable, 477 and
478
provisions providing for a private cause of action for unauthorized disclosure.
In sum, it is clear that state legislatures have, on a broad scale, recognized
the need to expand the protection of medical information in the face of
advancing technology. Jaffee explicitly ratified the use of this "consistent body
of policy determinations by state legislatures ' 479 as both reason and experience
for the purpose of recognizing new privileges under FRE 501.
8. Judicial Recognition of Privilege
The Jaffee Court noted that "[i]t
is of no consequence that recognition of
the privilege in the vast majority of States is the product of legislative action
rather than judicial decision. '480 The Court explained that "[a]lthough commonlaw rulings may once have been the primary source of new developments in
federal privilege law, that is no longer the case." 481 In evaluating "reason and
experience" under Jaffee, recognition of new privileges will likely be based more
heavily on legislative actions rather than judicial actions. Even so, there has
PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
471. See id (providing dates of laws' passage).
472. See id. (providing summary of federal and state laws dealing with genetic discrimination).
See also NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INS. OR
EMP. (providing links to other sources on genetic nondiscrimination legislation), at
http://www.genome.gov/11510227 (last visited Nov. 12 2004).
473. See NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 470 (outlining types of protection
varying state laws provide).
474. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802(A)(2) (West 2003) (requiring written authorization
for release of genetic testing information).
475. E.g., id. § 12-2802(A) (stating that information derived from genetic testing is confidential
and privileged).
476. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§1224(a), 1227 (2003) (prohibiting disclosure of genetic
information in response to subpoena and establishing penalties for violation of statute).
477. E.g., Genetic Information Privacy Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/15 (West 2003)
(prohibiting discovery or admission of genetic testing and information derived from genetic testing in
any legal proceeding except in specifically identified circumstances).
478. E.g., id. at 513/40 (authorizing private cause of action for unauthorized disclosure of genetic
testing information).
479. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
480. Id.
481. Id.
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been judicial recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege that mitigates in
favor of creating this new privilege.
In 2001, a magistrate for the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado in a federal question case involving the Federal Employers' Liability
Act rejected the plaintiff's sole argument that allowing the defendants to conduct
informal interviews with the plaintiff's treating physician would violate a federal
physician-patient privilege. 482 The plaintiff argued that section 1320d2-(d)(2) of
HIPAA should be recognized as codifying a federal physician-patient
privilege. 483 In rejecting this argument, the magistrate reiterated that there was
no federal physician-patient privilege. 484 This order was appealed to District
Court Judge Richard P. Matsch, who announced that "the Magistrate Judge's
orders resulted from an error of law in denying the existence of a physicianpatient privilege." 485 Judge Matsch further stated that "It]he privilege is
recognized, '486 although the privilege had been waived under the facts of the
487
case.
More recently, in NationalAbortion Federationv. Ashcroft,488 the Northern
District of Illinois recognized a federal physician-patient privilege in matters
relating to abortion. 489 In a case challenging the constitutionality of the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 ("PBABA"), 490 the government subpoenaed the
medical records from treating physicians of women who had received the banned
type of abortion procedure. 491 Chief Judge Charles Kocoras applied Jaffee and
FRE 501's evolutionary mandate and concluded that the intrusion on a woman's
privacy from possible release of confidential medical information outweighed the
loss of evidence to the government through a process that recognizes a federal
physician-patient privilege. 492 The government's subpoena was quashed and the
privilege was recognized. 493 The District Court's order was affirmed by the
49 4
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on other grounds.
In the related case challenging the PBABA, PlannedParenthoodFederation
of America v. Ashcroft,4 95 District Court Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the Northern
District of California denied the government's motions to compel production of

482. Lovato v. BurlingtonN. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., No. 00-M-2584, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7924,
at *4-5 (D. Colo. May 4,2001).
483. Id at *5.
484. Id. at *4-5.
485. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
486. Id.
487. Lovato, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9002, at *1.
488. No. 04-C-55, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 2004).
489. Id. at *19-20.
490. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
491. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701, at *3-5.
492. Id at *18-20.
493. Id.at *20.
494. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 932-33.
495. No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 2004), injunction
granted,320 F. Supp. 2d 957.
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abortion records. 496 Judge Hamilton explained that, even if the records sought
were redacted of certain "objectively identifying information," 497 such as names,
addresses, and birth dates, the remaining records contained information of "an
extremely personal and intimate nature," 498 such as contraception, sexual abuse
499
Most
or rape, marital status, or presence of sexually transmitted diseases.
significant for the purposes of privilege, Judge Hamilton noted that disclosure of
these medical records would "have a chilling effect on communications between
patients and providers." 5° ° Thus, Judge Hamilton articulated one of the most
compelling justifications for recognizing the new physician-patient privilege:
open communications between a patient and his 'or her physician in a
501
confidential relationship.
Following the trend of increased federal protection of medical privacy,
these three federal cases show a willingness on the part of federal judges to
recognize a federal physician-patient privilege.
9. The Medical Profession's National Recognition of the Need for a
Physician-Patient Privilege
The doctrine of doctor-patient confidentiality is deeply rooted within the
medical profession. The Hippocratic Oath can be traced back to the fourth
century B.C.5°2 It states in part: "[w]hat I may see or hear in the course of the
treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on
no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things
shameful to be spoken about. '50 3 Historically, the privacy of a patient's medical
information was protected by the professional responsibilities of the treating
physician. 50 4 Confidentiality has been a definitive characteristic of the physicianpatient relationship for centuries. 50 5 'Confidentiality in the physician-patient
relationship is "a situation in which information is disclosed within a trusting
relationship on the agreement that it will not be divulged to a third person
without the prior consent of the source of the information." 506 The canon of
50 7
confidentiality has been recognized by many medical professional groups.
496. Planned ParenthoodFed'n of Am., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *7.
497. Id. at *6.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at *6.
501. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11 (noting that protecting willingness of patients to confide in
psychotherapist serves both public and private interests).
502. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the origins of the Hippocratic Oath and the relevant text
regarding doctor patient confidentiality.
503. Id.
504. BOYLE & MACK, supranote 313, at 1:4.
505. See BRODY, ET AL., supra note 313, at 170 (discussing origins of physician-patient
confidentiality and its importance in modern medicine).
506. Id. at 171.
507. See id. at 179-87 (listing medical groups that have issued statements regarding
confidentiality).
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Most significantly, the American Medical Association provides:
The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the
relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the
greatest possible degree. The patient should feel free to make a full
disclosure of information to the physician in order that the physician
may most effectively provide needed services. The patient should be
able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will
respect the confidential nature of the communication. The physician
should not reveal confidential communications or information without
508
the express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law.
This ethical mandate is typical of the ethical codes of nearly all health care
professions: physicians, nurses, dentists and dental hygienists, mental health
professionals, social workers, pharmacists, and chiropractors. 509 These codes
usually refer to privacy or confidentiality as a "core value" or a "fundamental
tenet" and usually make respect for privacy a central principle of the health
510
professions.
Jaffee relied extensively on the judgments of professional associations in
Such widespread
recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 511
recognition of the need for confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship
by those in the best position to judge the effect of a lack of candor between
patients and physicians provides powerful "reason and experience" for
recognizing a federal physician-patient privilege.
10. Absence of a Federal Physician-Patient Privilege by the Advisory
Committee is Not Fatal to Recognition of a New Privilege
Concededly, while the American Law Institute included a physician-patient
privilege in Uniform Rule of Evidence 503,512 the Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not include a physician-patient privilege. 513 We
note that Jaffee relied, in part, on the inclusion of a proposed psychotherapistpatient privilege by the Advisory Committee in recognizing this new privilege
under FRE 501.514 Nonetheless, the absence of the physician-patient privilege
508. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 148 (2d ed. 2000).
509. See generally CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHics STANDARDS IN BUSINESS,
HEALTH, AND LAW (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999) (containing codes of ethics stressing
importance of confidentiality for various health care professions).
510. See, e.g., id. at 312 (noting American College of Physicians' description of confidentiality as
a fundamental tenant of medicine).
511. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 n.9 (relying on amici curiae brief by American Psychiatric
Association and American Psychological Association). See also id. at 13 n.12 (relying upon ethical
principles of psychologists and social workers in asserting that "any State's promise of confidentiality
would have little value if the patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in federal
court").

512. See supra note 446 for the text of Uniform Rule of Evidence 503.
513. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that Federal Rules of Evidence do not
recognize physician-patient privilege).
514. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15 (noting that States' support for psychotherapist-patient
privilege is reinforced by inclusion of privilege in recommendations to Advisory Committee).
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from the proposed rules does not diminish the compelling argument in favor of
its adoption under FRE 501.
515
While
First, privileges are always recognized on a "case-by-case basis."
the original proposed rules could be a guide to recognizing new privileges, they
are not dispositive. 516 Thus, the specific circumstances under which the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was adopted are not necessarily universally
applicable to all new privileges. Second, Jaffee itself, in recognizing privileged
communications to social workers as well as psychotherapists, went beyond the
scope of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504.517 Courts should not be
limited by the proposed rules of privileges. For example, the United States
518
Supreme Court, in Trammel v. United States, held that the testifying spouse
alone has the sole right to determine whether she would offer adverse
testimony, 519 rejecting the view of the Advisory Committee's proposed rule that
testimony. 520
gave the criminal defendant the right to bar a spouse's adverse
Thus, the absence of a physician-patient privilege in the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence should not diminish the courts' willingness to recognize this new
privilege.
11. The Pre-Jaffee "Wigmore" Test for Establishing Evidentiary Privileges
Putting the recent Jaffee decision aside, it should be noted that even under
5 21
traditional, and less flexible "Wigmore" test for establishing
time-honored,
the
new privileges, a physician-patient privilege should be recognized at this point in
time. This traditional test applies four fundamental factors:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
than the benefit thereby gained for the
communication must be greater
522
litigation.
of
correct disposal
515. Id. at 8 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974)).
516. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting only that "the
proposed rules provide a useful reference point and offer guidance in defining the existence and scope
of evidentiary privileges in the federal courts") (emphasis added).
517. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (discussing how Jaffee went beyond scope of
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504).
518. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
51.9. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
520. FED. R. EVID. 505(b) (proposed 1973).
521. Noted scholar and legal educator John Henry Wigmore wrote the seminal treatise on
Evidence (1904 and 1940).
522. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T.
McNaughton rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1961) (1904). This long-established test pre-dates the FRE and
Jaffee. Wigmore first discussed this test in Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Little Brown 1940).
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According to Wigmore, if any one of the above conditions is not met, the
asserted privilege is left without support and cannot be adopted. 52 3 Applying
this test to the physician-patient privilege, Wigmore found that the only
condition arguably met was the third one. 524 The first condition was not satisfied
because communications between physician and patient in the early 1900's were
not considered confidential. 525 Wigmore asserted that out of the thousands of
communications made every day by patients to physicians "[i]n only a few
instances.., is the fact communicated to a physician confidential in any real
sense... [blarring the facts of venereal disease and criminal abortion, there is
hardly a fact in the categories of medicine in which the patient himself attempts
' 526
to preserve any real secrecy."
The second condition was equally absent at the time Wigmore considered
the physician-client privilege because privacy-protective behavior was not
commonplace. 527 It was inconceivable that patients would be "deterred from
528
seeking medical help because of the possibility of disclosure in court.
The fourth condition was also not demonstrated in Wigmore's view because
any injury to the physician-patient relationship stemming from disclosure of
medical information was insubstantial.
In the first place, there is nothing in the world, by the nature. of the
injury, for the physician to disclose which any person would ordinarily
care to keep private from his neighbors.., furthermore, the few topics
- such as venereal disease and abortion - upon which secrecy might be
seriously desired by the patient come into litigation ordinarily in such
issues... that for these very facts common sense and justice demand
529
that the desire for secrecy shall not be listened to.
Therefore, according to Wigmore, a physician-patient privilege could not be
sustained.
This was the prevailing view pre-Jaffee.530 Obviously, much has changed in
the last half-century. Wigmore's arguments no longer hold true. For all the
reasons we have advanced throughout this article, we believe each and every one
of the four Wigmore conditions is met by today's physician-patient relationship
and the importance that relationship has to the individual patient and society in
general. Thus, even under the traditional, pre-Jaffee test, there is ample support
for the recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege.

523. WIGMORE, supranote 522, at § 2285.
524. Id. at § 2380a.

525. See id. (noting there are few instances where communications between physician and patient
are confidential).
526. Id.
527. Id. at § 2380a.
528. WIGMORE, supranote 522, at § 2380a.
529. Id. at § 2380a(4).
530. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Supreme Court's
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee demonstrates that there should also be a
physician-patient privilege.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence Article V, Rule 501 wisely
decided to forego codifying specific evidentiary privileges in favor of a more
flexible tool for creating evidentiary privileges. The flexible mandate of FRE
501 that allows federal courts to recognize new evidentiary privileges based on
"reason and experience" provides evidentiary privileges room to evolve as the
law and society change. A more appropriate situation to apply this evolutionary
mandate does not exist than in the case of a federal physician-patient privilege.
Our society has witnessed unimaginable and dramatic technological
achievements over the past few decades. While advances in medicine and
technology present the possibility of untold benefits to society, they also pose
untold threats-real, not imaginary threats-to personal privacy.
Congress recognized these threats in passing the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.531 It is certainly plausible that
Congress and HHS intended to protect medical privacy by crafting a new federal
physician-patient privilege. Both the language and underlying policies of
HIPAA support this conclusion. HIPAA has signaled an unprecedented and
unambiguous congressional intent to protect health information in the face of
rapidly emerging technology. However, protections for medical privacy under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule do not go far enough. Recognition of a federal
physician-patient privilege is necessary to close the gap that, absent the privilege,
would permit an individual's personal, private, and potentially damaging medical
information to be disclosed in court proceedings and redistributed to the public
many times over and thus defeating the very purpose of HIPAA.
The challenge to implement the policy of medical privacy also belongs to
the federal courts. They, in turn, should apply the mandate and process of FRE
501 to craft a new physician-patient privilege for use in federal court. FRE 501
requires courts to assess new privileges in light of "reason and experience"
looking to the logical basis for justifying recognition of a federal physicianpatient privilege as well as the underlying policies and actions taken by state and
federal legislatures. Together, HIPAA and the vast record of "reason and
experience" give a solid foundation for the physician-patient privilege. The
boundaries of such a privilege remain to be marked by the courts. However, the
need to recognize a federal physician-patient privilege is imperative.

531. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the increase in threats to
privacy and Congress' response in HIPAA.
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